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THE 1960 AMENDMENTS TO THE NEW YORK
STATUTES ON PERPETUITIES AND POWERS
OF APPOINTMENT
Robert S. Pasleyt
This article is based upon two studies prepared by the author as
consultant to the New York Law Revision Commission and submitted
in 1959 and 1960.1 For clarity of presentation, the two studies have
been consolidated and, in a few places, condensed. In addition, the
article has been brought down to date by indicating the recommendations actually made by the commission on the basis of the consultant's
studies and the action taken by the legislature thereon. It should be
emphasized, however, that nothing said herein purports to represent
the official position of the Law Revision Commission (except where
the latter's recommendations are actually quoted).
After an explanatory introduction, this article will treat four topics
on which legislation has been enacted in 1960:
(a) Addition of a twenty-one year period in gross;
(b) Construction of certain limitations which would prima facie be
invalid;
(c) Incidental matters relating to powers of appointment;
(d) The statutes limiting the creation of legal life estates and remainders thereon.
A subsequent article will treat the subject of accumulations for charitable purposes, on which the commission made certain recommendations
which were not adopted by the legislature.

I. HISTORICAL INTRODUCTION-1830 TO 1959
1.

The Revised Statutes of 1830
As is well known, the New York law of future interests is in large
measure the work of the revisers of 1828, whose revision of the New
York substantive law was enacted in 1828, effective January 1, 1830.2
Although their work has often been criticized, it was in fact a monumental achievement, representing as it did one of the first comprehen"See Contributors' Section, Masthead p. 722, for biographical data.
1 Rule Against Perpetuities and Related Matters, N.Y. Leg. Doc. No. 65(G) (1960);
Accumulations of Rents and Profits of Real Property and Income of Personal Property,
N.Y. Leg. Doc. No. 65(I) (1960).
2 See Powell & Whiteside, "The Statutes of the State of New York Concerning Perpetuities and Related Matters," N.Y. Leg. Doc. No. 65(H) at 23-24, 48-56 (1936), reprinted
in Report, Recommendations and Studies of N.Y. Law Rev. Comm'n (475), at (495)-(496),
(520)-(528) (1936). [Hereafter cited as "Powell & Whiteside"].

679

CORNELL LAW QUARTERLY

[Vol. 45

sive codifications of a large body of substantive law ever undertaken
in a common-law jurisdiction. But like all pioneer efforts it had its
weak spots, particularly in the area of future interests. Of particular
significance for our purposes were these:
(a) Limitation of the permissible period for suspension of the power
of alienation to two lives in being;
(b) Omission of any period in gross;
(c) Rendering all trusts to collect and pay over rents and profits
or income, spendthrift trusts and subjecting them ab initio to the
two-lives rule.
The first two changes resulted in a much stricter and less flexible
permissible period than eventually came to be recognized at common law.
The third caused a tremendous expansion of the scope and applicability
of the "Rule Against Perpetuities" or, as more properly described in
terms of the New York statutory language, the "rule against suspension
of the power of alienation. '
Criticism of these aspects of the Revised Statutes began almost at
once and continued with unabated vigor throughout the 19th century
and first half of the 20th.4 Strangely enough, however, the bench and
bar of New York seemed to develop a warm affection for their statutory
scheme and its neo-Gothic complexities, and reform proved to be extraordinarily difficult to achieve.
2. Report of Commission on Defects in the Law of Estates
In 1933, the Commission to Investigate Defects in the Law of
Estates, under the chairmanship of Surrogate James A. Foley, submitted to the legislature its Fourth Supplemental Report, which dealt
with this subject.' Although a majority of those persons who expressed
their views to the commission had favored some change in existing law,
the commission recommended that no change be made.0
Original Recommendations of the Law Revision Commission
In 1936 the New York Law Revision Commission, on the basis of
a comprehensive study made by Professors Richard R. Powell and
Horace E. Whiteside, made a series of recommendations for amend3.

3 Powell & Whiteside id. at 54-56, Report, Recommendations and Studies of N.Y. Law
Rev. Comm'n -at (526)-(528).
4 See criticisms of Chancellor Kent, judge Pound, and Professors Gray, Whiteside,
Powell, and Walsh, quoted in Powell & Whiteside op. cit supra note 2, at 19-21, Report,
Recommendations and Studies of N.Y. Law Rev. Comm'n at (491)-(493).
5 N.Y. Leg. Doc. No. 55 (1933).
6 Powell & Whiteside op. cit. supra note 2, at 22, Report, Recommendations and Studies
of N.Y. Law Rev. Comm'n at (494).
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ment of the New York statutes.7 In 1938, on the basis of another
study made by Professor Whiteside and Mrs. Laura Mulvaney, the,
commission modified these recommendations in some details and
recommended further statutory amendments relating to spendthrift
trusts. 8
In summary, the 1938 recommendations of the commission would
have accomplished the following:
(a) Change of the permissible period to multiple lives in being, plus
actual minorities and actual periods of gestation or, alternatively, twentyone years;
(b) Restriction of the application of the rule against suspension of
the power of alienation to future estates and powers of appointment,
exempting all estates in possession, whether in trust or not;
(c) Elimination of the rule making virtually all trusts in New York
spendthrift trusts, but permitting the creation of spendthrift trusts
under various limitations and safeguards;
(d) Clarification of the statutory definitions of vested and contingent
remainders;
(e) Repeal of sections 43 through 47 of the Real Property Law,
relating to certain legal life estates and remainders.
None of these recommendations was adopted at the time, or for
twenty years thereafter.
4.

The 1958 Legislation
By chapter 152 of the Laws of 1958, section 42 of the Real Property
Law and section 11 of the Personal Property Law were amended to
change the period during which the absolute power of alienation of real
property or the absolute ownership of personal property may lawfully
be suspended from a period measured by two lives in being to a period
measured by lives in being. Each section as amended included the
following:
In no case shall lives or minorities measuring the permissible period
be so designated or so numerous as to make proof of their end unreasonably difficult.The amendments applied to all inter vivos transfers effective on or
after September 1, 1958, and to estates or wills of persons dying on or
7 Communication of the Law Revision Commission to the Legislature Relating to the
Rule Against Perpetuities and Related Matters, N.Y. Leg. Doc. No. 65(H) (1936), reprinted in Report, Recommendations & Studies of N.Y. Law Rev. Comm'n (475), at

(473)-(608) (1936).

8 Recommendation of the Law Revision Commission to the Legislature Relating to the
Rule Against Perpetuities and Spendthrift Trusts, N.Y. Leg. Doc. No. 65(M) (1938),
reprinted in Report, Recommendations & Studies of N.Y. Law Rev. Comm'n (281)-(361)

(1938).
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after that date. Estates and interests created by or arising under inter
vivos transfers effective prior to September 1, 1958, or wills or estates
of persons dying before that date, continued to be governed by preexisting law.
Although not specifically recommended by the Law Revision Commission, these amendments effected the most important of the reforms
urged by the commission in 1936 and 1938, namely, the substitution of
a permissible period measured by multiple lives in being for one
measured by only two lives. The "evidentiary" test, prohibiting the
designation of such a large number of lives as to make proof of their
end unreasonably difficult, was included in almost the same language
in the 1936 recommendations of the Law Revision Commission, but
was omitted from the 1938 recommendations. It is, however, in accord
with the common law of the United States' and is found, in very
similar language, in the Model Rule Against Perpetuities Act,"° which is
intended to restate the American common-law rule, and has been
adopted in California and Wyoming."
The amendments made no other change in the existing New York rules
on this subject which, either by express statutory provision or by
judicial interpretation, continued to include the following:
(a) A "restricted minority" provision, 2 but no general minority provision and no period in gross.
(b) A rule that in some situations a trust might be continued, after
lives in being, for the minority of the ultimate taker, on the theory that
the power of alienation could be suspended in any event by appointment
of a guardian."
(c) A rule that actual periods of gestation may be included in the
permissible period, either as lives or minorities in being at the creation
of the estate,14 or as an additional period or periods after lives in being.'5
(d) A rule that the power of alienation is unlawfully suspended by
a remote contingent future interest even if there are persons in being
by whom a fee could be conveyed.'"
Fitchie v. Brown, 211 U.S. 321 (1908).
I' 9C ULA 76 (1957).
11 Cal. Civ. Code §§ 715.1, 715.2 (Deering Supp. 1959); Wyo. Comp. Stat. Ann §§
34-39, 34-40 (1957).
12 N.Y. Real Prop. Law § 42 (prior to 1960 amendment); N.Y. Pers. Prop. Law § 11
(prior to 1960 amendment); Manice v. Manice, 43 N.Y. 303 (1871).
'3 Matter of Eveland, 284 N.Y. 64, 29 N.E.2d 471 (1940); Matter of Trevor, 239 N.Y. 6,
145 N.E. 66 (1924); 5 Powell, Real Property 1f799 (1956).
14 N.Y. Real Prop. Law § 42; N.Y. Pers. Prop. Law § 11.
15 Smith v. Edwards, 88 N.Y. 92, 110 (1882); Chaplin, Suspension of the Power of
Alienation and Postponement of Vesting under the Laws of New York § 109 (3d ed.
1928). Cf. In re Havesgaard's Estate, 59 S.D. 26, 238 N.W. 130 (1931).
16 Walker v. Marcellus & O.L. Ry., 226 N.Y. 347, 123 N.E. 736 (1919); Matter of Wilcox, 194 N.Y. 288, 87 N.E. 497 (1909).
9
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(e) A rule that the power of alienation is suspended by a trust to
collect rents or profits of real property, or income of personal property,
and apply them to the use of any person, and that any such trust which
may by any possibility continue for more than lives in being (plus a
possible minority, as explained in (b) above) is void ab initio, either
in toto or, if the offending portion can be severed, at least in part.'7
(f) A rule that the prohibitions of Real Property Law, section 42,
and Personal Property Law, section 11, do not apply to possibilities of
reverter or powers of termination, 8 or to options, whether in gross or
appurtenant to a lease.' 9
Not so clear is whether various constructional devices, developed by
the courts to ease the rigors of the old rule,20 will continue to be invoked
by the New York courts. Clearly there will be no further need for those
which related solely to the two-lives rule, but as to the others the force of
judicial precedent may give them continued vitality.21
5. The 1959 Legislation-Powers of Appointment
The 1936 and 1938 recommendation did not cover powers of appointment, and the 1958 legislation was silent on this subject. Real Property
Law, section 178, formerly provided:
§ 178. Computation of term of suspension
The period during which the absolute right of alienation may be
suspended, by an instrument in execution of a power, must be computed,
not from the date of such instrument, but from the time of the creation
of the power.
Real Property Law, section 179, formerly provided:
§ 179. Capacity to take under a power
An estate or interest can not be given or limited to any person, by an
instrument in execution of a power, unless it would have been valid, if
given or limited at the time of the creation of the power.
22
These statutes have been held applicable to personal property.
It could be argued, although there are no cases reported, that so
long as these statutes remained unchanged, the old perpetuities period
'7 Matter of Homer, 237 N.Y. 489, 143 N.E. 655 (1924); Haynes v. Sherman, 117 N.Y.
433, 22 N.E. 938 (1889).
18 Leonard v. Burr, 18 N.Y. 96 (1858); 5 Powell, Real Property I 769 (1956).
19 Matter of City of New York, 246 N.Y. 1, 157 N.E. 911, reargument denied, 246 N.Y.
549, 159 N.E. 646 (1927), cert. denied, 276 US. 626 (1928); Epstein v. Werbelovsky, 193
App. Div. 428, 184 N.Y. Supp. 330 (2d Dep't 1920), aff'd, 233 N.Y. 525, 135 N.E. 902
(1922).
2o Powell & Whiteside op. cit. supra note 2, at 85-108, Report, Recommendations and
Studies of N.Y., Law Rev. Comtn'n at (557)-(580).
21 See Note, 43 Cornell L.Q. 703, 706-09 (1958).
22 Low v. Bankers Trust Co., 270 N.Y. 143, 200 N.E. 674 (1936); Fargo v. Squiers, 154
N.Y. 250, 258, 48 N.E. 509, 510 (1897); Geneva Trust Co. v. Sill, 27 N.Y.S.2d 289, 293
(Sup. Ct. Ontario County 1941).
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of two lives in being (plus a restricted minorfty) would continue to be
applicable to any interest given or limited by an instrument in execution
of a power created prior to September 1, 1958, measured from the time of
creation of the power, even though the instrument executing the power
took effect on or after that date.
But on April 16, 1959, chapter 456 of the Laws of New York, 1959,
took effect, amending these two sections of the Real Property Law to
read as follows:
§ 178. Computation of term of suspension
The period during which the absolute right of alienation of real
property or the absolute ownership of personal property may be suspended[,] by an instrument in execution of a power[, must be computed,
not from the date of such instrument, but from the time of the creation
of the power, provided, however, that the permissible number of lives
under section forty-two of this chapter and under section eleven of the
personal property law shall be determined under the law in effect at the
time of the execution of the power and not the law in effect at the time of
the creation of the power...
§ 179. Capacity to take under a power
An estate or interest can not be given or limited to any person[,]
by an instrument in execution of a power[,] unless it would have been
valid[,] if given or limited at the time of the creation of the power, provided, however, that the permissible number of lives under section fortytwo of this chapter and under section eleven of the personal property law
shall be determined under the law in effect at the time of the execution of
the power and not the law in effect at the time of the creation of the
power . . .
The same act amended section 2 of chapter 163 and section 2 of
chapter 152 of the Laws of 1958, which had made September 1, 1958,
the effective date for the 1958 amendments to the Real Property Law,
section 42, and the Personal Property law, section 11, discussed above.
Under the 1959 amendments, the same effective date, September 1,
1958, is to be applied to all inter vivos instruments executed on or
after that date, and to all wills of persons dying on or after that date,
in so far as they exercise any powers granted or reserved prior to
September 1, 1958.
In all other respects, these amendments took effect immediately, that
is, on April 16, 1959.
These amendments pose two problems of retroactivity:
(a) The first and more general question is whether, under the
doctrine of "relation back," codified in section 178 of the Real Property
Law, it is permissible to substitute a new and more liberal test for
determining the validity of an estate or interest given or limited after
the effective date of the amendments by an instrument executing a
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power created or reserved prior to that date. 3 For this type of retroactivity there is support in the statutes of other jurisdictions and in
learned comment,2 4 but there seem to be no judicial precedents.
(b) The second and more limited question of retroactivity is presented by that feature of the amendments which makes them effective as
to estates or interests given or limited by instruments taking effect
between September 1, 1958, and April 16, 1959, exercising powers
created or reserved prior to September 1, 1958. This problem could
arise only in the case of an instrument (i) taking effect between September 1, 1958, and April 16, 1959, (ii) exercising a power created or
reserved prior to September 1, 1958, (iii) so as to give or limit an
estate or interest which would be void under the two lives rule but which
would be valid under the multiple lives rule. In the nature of things,
this combination of circumstances has probably not been present in
more than a fraction of cases, if at all. Various arguments can be advanced to support this type of retroactivity, 5 but there are no statutes
or judicial precedents squarely on the question.
The 1959 amendments made no other changes in the rather complex
statutory system of powers created by the Revised Statutes of 1830.
6. The 1959 Legislation-Accumulations
The 1936 and 1938 recommendations of the Law Revision Commission said nothing about accumulations. Prior to 1959, the New York
statutes.' on accumulations, dating from 1830, but amended several
times thereafter, were very strict. All provisions directing accumulation
were invalid, except in the case of
(a) an accumulation for the benefit of one or more minors, to terminate at or before the expiration of their minority, provided (i) such
minors were then in being or (ii) if the accumulation was directed to
23 The argument would be that the taker in default, or intestate distributees, had a
vested right, under the doctrine of relation back, in the permissible period effective where
the power was created.
24 See, e.g., Vt. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 27 § 502 (1959); Powell, "Changes in the New York
Statutes on Perpetuities and Accumulations: A Report and a Proposal," 58 Colum. L. Rev.
1196, 1204 (1958). But cf. Report No. 290, N.Y. County Lawyers Ass'n, Committee on
Surrogates' Court, on S. Intr. No. 2668, Print No. 2793 (Mar. 24, 1960).
25 For example: The amendment serves to validate rather than invalidate gifts and to
carry out, rather than frustrate, the intent of the person exercising the power. Or, that the
amendment only clarified the intention of the Legislature in enacting the 1958 amendments.
The 1945 amendments (N.Y. Sess. Laws 1945, ch. 558, §§ 1, 2) to § 61-a of the N.Y. Real
Property Law and § 16-a of the N.Y. Personal Property Law (since repealed) were intended
to apply to existing instruments. (See Report of N.Y. Law Rev. Comm'n, Leg. Doc. No.
65(I) (1945)). The California statute abolishing the doctrine of worthier title, enacted on
the recommendation of the California Law Revision Commission, is expressly made
applicable to existing instruments. (Cal. Civ. Code, § 1073 (Deering Supp. 1959)). See
Cal. Law Rev. Comm'n, Recommendations and Study Relating to the Doctrine of
Worthier Title, D-6 (Jam 1959).
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begin in the future, it was so limited as to begin and end within the
time allowed for the vesting of future estates;
(b) certain accumulations for charitable or educational purposes,
with various limitations and restrictions as to type, amount, and duration; and
(c) accumulations arising under pension, disability or death benefit,
or profit-sharing plans, subject to certain limitations and restrictions.
(d) certain funded insurance trusts.28
(e) certain other statutory exemptions, which will be mentioned
below.
Chapters 453 and 454 of the Laws of 1959 amended the relevant
statutes in the following respects:
(a) Personal Property Law, section 16, was amended to delete everything up to the first proviso and to insert the following:
All directions for the accumulation of the income of personal property
except such as are allowed by statute shall be void. A direction for the
accumulation of the income of personal property contained in any instrument sufficient to bass such property is valid, if such accumulation be directed to commence within the time allowed for the suspension of the
absolute ownership of such property and to terminate at or before the
expiration of such time. If a direction for any such accumulation be for
a period extending beyond the expiration of such time, it shall have the
same effect as if such accumulation were directed to terminate upon such
expiration.
(b) Real Property Law, section 61, was amended in the same
manner, with the substitution of the words "rents and profits" for
"income," "real property" for "personal property," and "vesting of
future estates12 7 for "absolute ownership of such property."

(c) Personal Property Law, section 16-a, and Real Property Law,
section 61-a, providing for the disposition of accumulations on the
death of a minor during his minority, were repealed.
(d) Personal Property Law, section 17(1), providing for anticipation
of a directed accumulation where deemed necessary for support or
education, was amended to substitute the word "person" for "minor"
wherever the latter appeared, and to add the words "or committee"
after the word "guardian."
(e) Real Property Law, section 62, which parallels section 17(1) of
the Personal Property Law, was amended in the same manner with
some additional changes of language.
26 N.Y. Real Prop. Law § 61; N.Y. Pers. Prop. Law § 16.
27 This language is inept, because elsewhere the New York statutes talk in terms of
('suspension of the power of alienation" rather than "vesting of future estates." See
Sparks, "Future Interests," 1959 Annual Survey of New York Law, 34 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 1499,
1505 (1959). However, the same language was used in N.Y. Real Prop. Law § 61, prior
to its amendment.
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These amendments took effect September 1, 1959, applying to all
inter vivos transfers effective on or after that date and to estates or
wills of persons dying on or after that date. Inter vivos transfers
effectivSprior to September 1, 1959, and estates and wills of persons
dying prior to that date, continued to be governed by the old law.
The amendments made no other changes in the New York statutes
relating to accumulations, which continue to include the following:
(a) Complex provisos in Real Property Law, section 61, and Personal Property Law, section 16, permitting accumulations for various
educational and charitable purposes, subject to certain limitations and
restrictions.
(b) Provisos in Real Property Law, section 61, and Personal Property
Law, section 16, permitting accumulations under employee stock bonus
plans, pension plans, disability or death benefit plans, or profit-sharing
plans.
(c) A proviso in Personal Property Law, section 16, permitting
funded insurance trusts.
(d) Provisions in Personal Property Law, section 13-d, exempting
from the laws against accumulation a trust created under a retirement
plan for which provision has been made under the laws of the United
States exempting such trust from federal income tax, and permitting
accumulation of income from such trust until the period set for
distribution.
(e) Provisions in the Decedent Estate Law, section 47-e (5) and
(6), authorizing accumulation of income in the case of a testamentary
gift to an unincorporated association to preserve the property pending
incorporation.
(f) Provisions in the Insurance Law, section 200 (9), authorizing
accumulation of income in the case of a trust created under a "retirement system" authorized by said section 200 until, in the opinion of the
trustees, a sufficient sum exists to accomplish the purposes of the trust.
(g) A rule, set forth in Real Property Law, section 63, that where
there is a valid suspension of the power of alienation or of ownership,
during which rents and profits are undisposed of, and no valid direction
for their accumulation is given, such rents and profits belong to the persons presumptively entitled to the next eventual estate, with a proviso
that where any person shall legally begin to receive any such undisposed
rents or profits, under said section 63 or otherwise, he shall continue to
receive the same notwithstanding the birth thereafter of a child or
children to any person or persons receiving all or any part of such rents
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and profits. (The rule laid down in this section is equally applicable to
future interests in personal property.2 )
(h) A provision in Personal Property Law, section 17-a, to the effect
that, unless otherwise directed, stock dividends arising under a trust
shall be treated as principal rather than income, and that addition of
such stock dividends to principal shall not be deemed an accumulation
of income.
(i) A provision in Personal Property Law, section 17-b, for the distribution of income from real or personal property earned during the
period of administration of the estate of a testator.
(j) Provisions in Personal Property Law, section 17-c, setting forth
rules for apportionment of principal and income arising from mortgage
investments under trusts and arising from mortgage salvage operations.
(k) Provisions in Personal Property Law, section 17-d, for the
apportionment as between principal and income under trusts consisting
of bonds or other obligations bought with a premium or discount or
maturing with loss or gain.
(1) Provisions in Personal Property Law, section 17-e, for determining the date of accrual of dividends on stock held in an estate, trust,
or other fund, for purposes of apportionment as between principal and
income.
The 1959 Legislation-Legal Life Estates; Remainders in or on
Terms of Years
Chapter 452 of the Laws of New York, 1959, amended sections 43,
45, and 46 of the Real Property Law in the following respects:
(a) Section 43 of the Real Property Law, which formerly restricted
the number of successive life estates to two, voided any additional life
estates, and accelerated any remainders limited thereon,29 was amended
to delete all these restrictions. All that remained was a rule that successive life estates could be limited only to persons in being at the creation
thereof.
(b) Section 45 of the Real Property Law, which formerly provided
that where a remainder was created on an estate pur autre vie for more
than two lives, the remainder should take effect on the death of the two
persons first named, was amended so as to prohibit a remainder which
followed an estate pur autre vie measured by an unreasonably large
number of lives (using the same "evidentiary test" now found in section
42 of the Real Property Law), with the proviso that if any such pro7.

28 Matter of Harteau, 204 N.Y. 292, 97 N.E. 726 (1912).
29 The acceleration provision has been construed as applying only to vested remainders.
Purdy v. Hayt, 92 N.Y. 446 (1883).
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hibited remainder was created, it would take effect immediately, as if
no life estates had been created.
(c) Section 46 of the Real Property Law, which formerly restricted
contingent remainders on terms of years to those which must vest not
later than the termination of two lives in being, was amended to delete
the limitation to two lives, and to substitute a reference to "lives in
being," subject to the same "evidentiary test" already provided in
section 42 of the Real Property Law.
(d) All three amendments took effect on September 1, 1959, and
applied to inter vivos instruments executed on or after that date and
to wills of persons dying after that date (including instruments exercising powers of appointment granted or reserved prior to that date).
The amendments did not affect section 44 of the Real Property Law,
which restricted a remainder following an estate pur autre vie to a remainder in fee, and a remainder following a life estate in a term of years
to a remainder for the whole residue of such term. Nor did they affect
section 47 of the Real Property Law, which restricted the limitation of
a remainder for life following a term of years to a remainder in a person
in being at the creation of such interest.
The literature on the 1958 and 1959 amendments is already extensive,80 and it is unnecessary to review it here.
II.

SCOPE OF CHANGES RECOMMENDED IN

1960

Given this situation, the question presented itself what further
changes, if any, should be recommended by the New York Law Revision
Commission. There appeared to be three alternatives:
(1) Substantial adoption of the 1938 recommendations of the commission, with only such changes as were necessary to reflect the amendments made in 1958 and 1959. Ideally, this was- the most desirable
course. The commission's prior recommendations were a comprehensive,
well thought out, and integrated set of amendments, which would bring
the New York statutes in line with the common law and the law of the
majority of the states. It was believed, however, that this alternative was
impracticable. It did not seem likely that the legislature, after making the
30 See, e.g., Dorris, "Perpetuities Legislation in New York: A Partial Return to the
Fold," 22 Queens B. Bull. 70 (1958); Hesson, "The New Rule Against Perpetuities," 22
Albany L. Rev. 263 (1958); Ylorfein, "Public Policy and the Rule Against Perpetuities,"
5 N.Y.L.F. 169 (1959); Niles, "Two Lives Down-And Goal to Go," 98 Trusts & Estates
104 (1959) ; Powell, "Changes in the New York Statutes on Perpetuities and Accumulations:
A Report and a Proposal," 58 Colum. L. Rev. 1196 (1958); Sparks, "Future Interests," 1958
Annual Survey of New York Law, 33 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 1193, 1201-02 (1958) and in 1959
Annual Survey of New York Law, 34 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 1499-1505 (1959); Notes, 22 Albany
L. Rev. 413 (1958); 24 Brooklyn L. Rev. 344 (1958); 43 Cornell L.Q. 703 (1958); 57 Mich.
L. Rev. 303 (1958); 34 Notre Dame Law. 123 (1958).
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first really basic changes in the New York law of perpetuities in 128
years, would be willing to repeal its amendments within less than two
years in favor of an ideal plan of reform, however carefully worked out.
This seemed especially true when it was realized that the strongest argument in favor of reform, the unsatisfactory working of the two-lives rule,
had been removed.
Furthermore, as a matter of substance, it seemed doubtful that the
1938 plan of reform would commend itself to the legislature at this
time, or win the support of bench and bar. Essentially, it involved going
back to the common law, not only as to the permissible period (already
substantially accomplished), but also as to applicability of the rule
against perpetuities itself. Under the 1938 proposals, the rule against
perpetuities would apply only to remote future interests which suspend
or fetter alienation (contingent remainders and executory interests), but
not to present interests, that is to say, trusts would cease to be spendthrift trusts as a matter of law, and the interest of the beneficiary would
be freely alienable. It would still be possible to create spendthrift and
indestructible trusts by special provision in the instrument of creation,
but their duration-as to the spendthrift and indestructible featureswould be strictly limited to the lives of the beneficiaries. However desirable such a reform might be, it seemed doubtful that it would gain wide
support in New York at this time."'
(2) The second alternative was to go beyond the common law approach and adopt one or more of the recent, radical reforms such as
"wait-and-see," "cy pres," or "discarding the vest."
(a) "Wait-and-See." The basic idea here is a repudiation of the common-law rule, followed in New York, that a future interest is void if by
any possibility it may vest, if at all, beyond the permissible period,
without regard to the inherent probability of the invalidating event and
without regard to the actual course of events. Under an absolute waitand-see rule the interest is valid if in fact it vests within the permissible
period and is void only if the permissible period expires without the
interest vesting. Under a modified wait-and-see approach, although the
same basic principle is applied, the waiting period consists of the lives
of persons in being during or at the end of which the interest is to take
effect, rather than the full permissible period in the abstract. The
former is now law in Pennsylvania, Vermont, and (applicable to trusts
only) Washington; 3 the latter in Kentucky, Massachusetts, Connecticut,
S1 For a persuasive argument in favor of such a change, see Sparks, "Policy Considerations: Alienability of the Beneficial Interest in a Trust in New York," 9 Buffalo L. Rev.
26 (1959).
32 Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 20, §§ 301.4, 301.5 (Purdon, 1950); Wash. Rev. Code §§ 11.98.01011.98.900 (Supp. 1959); Vt. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 27, §§ 501-503 (1959).
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and Maine.38 A modified version of "wait-and-see" has been recommended

by the English Law Reform Committee. 34
Although "wait-and-see" is enthusiastically supported by Professor

Leach and others,3 5 its soundness has been questioned by Professor
Simes, Professor Sparks, and other writers. 36 The most recent criticism,

based on the Pennsylvania statute, has been voiced by Professor
Mechem.3 7
The literature on this subject is already extensive, but actual experience has been minimal. It did not seem wise to recommend that New
York adopt such a radical change, still in the experimental stage, while
that state is only beginning to recover from some of the unfortunate
and unforeseen consequences of the legislative experiment of the last
century.

(b) "Cy pres." Professor Simes and others have recommended that
some of the harsh results of strict application of the common-law Rule

Against Perpetuities could be ameliorated by giving the courts power
to modify limitations in wills or other instruments so as to eliminate any

invalid features while carrying out as near as may be the intentions of
the testator or settlor. 8 Legislation to this effect has been recently enacted in Vermont, Idaho, and Kentucky. 9 More limited, but to the
same end, are the provisions of the English Law of Property Act of 1925
33 Conn. Gen. Stat. §§ 45-95 to 45-100 (1958); Ky. S. Bill 180, Reg. Sess. 1960;
Mass. Ann. Laws c. 184A, §§ 1-6 (1955); Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. c. 160, §§ 27-33 (Supp.
1959).
34 Law Reform Comm., Fourth Report (The Rule Against Perpetuities), Cmd. No. 18
(1956).
35 Leach, "Perpetuities in Perspective: Ending the Rule's Reign of Terror," 65 Harv.
L. Rev. 721 (1952); Leach, "Perpetuities Legislation, Massachusetts Style," 67 Harv. L.
Rev. 1349 (1954); Leach, "Perpetuities: New Absurdity, Judicial and Statutory Correctives," 73 Harv. L. Rev. 1318 (1960); Tudor, "Absolute Certainty of Vesting Under the
Rule Against Perpetuities-A Self-Discredited Relic," 34 B.U.L. Rev. 129 (1954); Tudor,
"The Impact of Recent Statutory Adoption of the 'Wait and See' Principle on the Common Law Rule Against Perpetuities," 38 B.U.L. Rev. 540 (1958); Brgy, "A Defense of
Pennsylvania's Statute on Perpetuities," 23 Temp. L.Q. 313 (1950).
36 Simes, Public Policy and the Dead Hand 65-66, 71-82 (1955). Simes, "Reform of
Rule Against Perpetuities: Qualified Endorsement," 92 Trusts & Estates 770 (1953) ; Simes,
"Is the Rule Against Perpetuities Doomed? The 'Wait and See' Doctrine," 52 Mich. L. Rev.
179 (1953); Simes, "The Policy Against Perpetuities," 103 U. Pa. L. Rev. 707, 732-33
(1955); Sparks, "A Decade of Transition in Future Interests, Il," 45 Va. L. Rev. 493,
495-500 (1959); Sparks, Book Review, 32 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 636 (1957); Fratcher, Book Review, 55 Mich. L. Rev. 149, 152-53 (1956).
The recent Montana amendments expressly adopt the common-law certainty of vesting
rule. Mont. Rev. Codes Ann. § 67-406(b) (Supp. 1959).
37 Mechem, "Further Thoughts on the Pennsylvania Perpetuities Legislation," 107 U.
Pa. L. Rev. 965 (1959).
38 Simes, Public Policy and the Dead Hand 74-79 (1955); Simes, "Is the Rule Against
Perpetuities Doomed? The 'Wait and See' Doctrine," 52 Mich. L. Rev. 179, 193 (1953);
Quarles, "The Cy Pres Doctrine: Its Application to Cases Involving the Rule Against
Perpetuities and Trusts for Accumulation," 21 N.Y.U.L.Q. Rev. 384 (1946).
39 Idaho Code Ann. § 55-111 (1957); Ky. S. Bill 180, Reg. Sess. 1960; Vt. Stat. Ann. tit.
27, § 501 (1959).
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and of the Massachusetts, Connecticut, and Maine legislation, that in
certain cases age limitations beyond twenty-one years are to be reduced
to twenty-one when this is necessary to save a gift.4" (New Hampshire
has reached the same result by judicial decision. 41)
There is much to be said for this approach. For two reasons, however,
it was believed that it would be premature to advocate it for New York
at this time, except in the limited form of reducing age contingencies to
twenty-one years:
(i) It seemed too soon after the recent reforms to advocate another,
vague and uncertain in scope, and as yet relatively untried in those
jurisdictions which have adopted it.
(ii) The New York courts have been quite liberal as it is in excising
and, on occasion, modifying by constructional devices provisions in
wills and other instruments in order to avoid invalidity, while carrying
out as closely as possible the testator's or settlor's supposed intention.42
While this is not exactly cy pres, as envisaged by Professor Simes and
others, it comes close to it. It is true that the New York courts adopted
this approach largely to avoid the strictness of the two-lives rule, and
they may not -be willing to follow it under the relaxed rule now in effect.
On the other hand, it was not necessarily limited to provisions void solely
because of the two-lives rule and has sometimes been invoked to save
limitations which would have been equally invalid under a multiple
lives rule.43 There is no reason to suppose that this approach will be
abandoned under the amended rule, to the extent it may be applicable.
(c) "Discarding the Vest." Whereas the other two proposals are in
the direction of relaxing the common-law rule against perpettiities, this
one would make it stricter by applying the rule to all non-possessory
future interests (except perhaps reversions, powers of termination, and
possibilities of reverter). In other words, the requirement would not be
one of vesting (if at all) within the permissible period, but of taking
effect in possession (if at all) within that period.
This recommendation goes as far back as Gray.44 It is supported by
Professor Simes, 4' and has most recently been propounded at length by
40 Conn. Gen. Stat. § 45-96 (1958); Mass. Ann. Laws c. 184A, § 2 (1955); Me. Rev.
Stat. § 28 (Supp. 1959); Law of Property Act, 1925, 15 & 16 Geo. 5, § 163, 20 Halsbury,
Stats. of England 770 (2d ed. 1950).
41 Edgerly v. Barker, 66 N.H. 434, 31 AUt. 900 (1891).
42 See Powell & Whiteside, op. cit. supra note 2, at 98-103, Report, Recommendations
and Studies of N.Y. Law Rev. Comm'n at- (570)-(575).
43 Schettler v. Smith, 41 N.Y. 328 (1 69). Cf. Estate of Heard, 25 Cal. 2d 322, 153
P.2d 553 (1944).
44 Gray, The Rule Against Perpetuities, app. M., 819-22 (4th ed. 1942).
45 Simes, Public Policy and the Dead Hand 80-82 (1955); Simes, "The Policy Against
Perpetuities," 103 U. Pa. L. Rev. 707, 737-38 (1955).
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Mr. Daniel M. Schuyler of the Illinois Bar.4" It has the great advantage
of simplifying the law, making it more realistic (non-possessory future
interests act as a practical restraint on alienation even when vested,
although perhaps not to the same extent as when contingent), and of
removing one of the principle remaining distinctions in practical effect
between vested and contingent remainders. Nevertheless, it was not
recommended for New York at this time for the following reasons:
(i) It seemed too soon after the 1958 and 1959 amendments to introduce such a radical change in the whole theory of the Rule Against
Perpetuities.
(ii) It would not have much practical effect in New York, so long
as the chief impact of the statutory rule against suspension of the power
of alienation is on the duration of trusts, rather than on contingent
future interests. The vast majority of "perpetuities" cases in New York
involve the duration of trusts rather than the problem of contingent
future interests. It is unusual to find cases involving the latter which do
not also involve the former. True, there have been cases in New York
of future interests held valid because they would necessarily become
vested, if at all, within the permissible period, which might have been
invalid if the rule required a taking effect in possession,47 but, overall,
such cases have not been numerous.
(3) The third alternative was the adoption of minor amendments
designed to improve the law within the general framework of the 1830
Revised Statutes, as amended in 1958 and 1959, completing the reforms
initiated by the latter. This alternative was the one recommended by the
commission. The specific changes recommended and enacted will now
be taken up.
III. ADDITION OF A PERIOD IN GRoss
The 1936 and 1938 recommendations of the Law Revision Commission included a recommendation that the permissible period for suspension of the power of alienation (or of absolute ownership) be, alternatively, (i) lives in being plus actual minorities at the end of such lives
and one or more actual periods of gestation, or (ii) twenty-one years.
The present "restricted minority" provision would have been deleted.
In 1959 the legislature passed a bill4 ' which would have amended
section 42 of the Real Property Law, as previously amended, to delete
the restricted minority provision, and to authorize a gross "term of not
46 Schuyler, "Should the Rule Against Perpetuities Discard Its Vest?," 56 Mich. L. Rev.
683, 887 (1958).
47 See, e.g., Matter of Brewster, 246 App. Div. 192, 283 N.Y. Supp. 707 (4th Dep't 1935),
aff'd, 271 N.Y. 599, 3 N.E.2d 204 (1936).
48 S. Intr. No. 623, Print No. 4022 (1959).
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more than twenty-one years" in addition to the period of lives in being.
This amendment was to take effect on September 1, 1959. A companion
bill, to make corresponding amendments to section 11 of the Personal
Property Law,4 9 failed of passage during the closing sessions of the
legislature. For this reason the Governor vetoed the bill which had
passed, stating that, while the change which it sought to accomplish was
desirable, considerable confusion in the administration of trusts and
estates would be created if the real property law were to be amended
without a corresponding change in the personal property law.5"
There is little question of the desirability of (i) eliminating the complex provisions of the restricted minority rule now in effect in New York,
and (ii) allowing an additional or alternative period of twenty-one years.
The 1936 and 1938 recommendations of the commission would have
allowed an additional period measured by actual minorities, or an alternative period of twenty-one years in gross. It may be that the commission thought that to go further than this would be too drastic a change
in the New York law. The commission did say that its proposal "would
remove many of the present difficulties and still put a reasonable limitation upon suspension of alienation and upon the fettering of alienation. '51
Three states formerly provided for a period in gross as an alternative
to a period measured by lives in being, namely California, North
Dakota, and Oklahoma,5" but all three have since substituted an additional period of twenty-one years in 'gross. California has adopted the
Model Rule Against Perpetuities Act, based on the common law,53 and
in 1959 repealed its surviving statutes on suspension of the power of
alienation.5 4 North Dakota has had the common law period since 1953.11
In 1941 Oklahoma repealed its alternative period in gross, which was
applicable only to the duration of trusts,5 6 but the resulting situation is
57

still confused.

The Mississippi situation is sui generis. There is a peculiar statute,
which permits a gift to a "succession of donees then living" (formerly
limited to two donees).58 Its exact effect is obscure and there is considerable confusion in the cases whether it supplements or is exclusive
49

S. Intr. No. 624 (1959).

50 Memorandum filed with S. Intr. No. 623, Print No. 4022 (April 16, 1959).

51 N.Y. Leg. Doc. No. 65(H) 7 (1936), reprinted in Report, Recommendations and
Studies of the N.Y. Law Rev. Comm'n (479) (1936).
52 Powell & Whiteside, op. cit. supra note 2, at 130-31, Report, Recommendations and
Studies of N.Y. Law Rev. Comm'n at (603).
53 Cal. Civ. Code § 715.2 (Deering, Supp. 1959).
54 Cal. Stats. 1959, ch. 470.
55 N.D. Laws 1953, ch. 274, amending N.D. Rev. Code § 47-0227 (1943).
56 Okla. Laws 1941, § 47, at 264; Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 60, § 176.47 (1949).
57 See Browder, "Perpetuities in Oklahoma," 6 Okla. L. Rev. 1 (1953).
58 Miss. Code Ann. § 838 (1956).
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of the common-law rule, so that it cannot be said with certainty whether
Mississippi recognizes a period in gross or not.5 9
Louisiana, a civil law jurisdiction, is also sui generis, but now allows
trusts limited to ten years or the life of the beneficiary, whichever is
longer.60
Only two states still do not recognize any period in gross, either in
addition to lives in being or as an alternative period. They are Minnesota
(two-life statutory rule, but applicable only to duration of certain trusts
in land; common-law rule applicable to personalty; apparently no
restriction on creation of remote future interests in land)61 and South
Dakota.62 Montana added a period in gross only last year.6
The vast majority of jurisdictions, either by statute or judicial
decision, recognize the common law period of lives in being, plus one or
more periods of gestation, plus a period in gross of twenty-one years.
Two have extended the period in gross beyond twenty-one years. They
are Idaho (twenty-five years) 64 and Wisconsin (thirty years).65
The English Law Reform Committee has recommended an alternative
period in gross of eighty years.16 But this is for the purpose of discouraging the use of the "royal lives" clause (e.g., all living descendants of
King George VI).67 The royal lives clause, or its equivalent, is not used
in this country. It seems to be used in England, not so much to designate
a period at the end of which certain future interests are to take effect, as
to provide an outside limit of time within which various interests may
shift, under a mode of property settlement quite unlike our own. There
seems to be no real need, under American practice, for any such
extended period in gross.
There seems to be general agreement that a period in gross would be
desirable in New York. 8 The following cases, cited with many others
59 See Carter v. Sunray Mid-Continent Oil Co., 231 Miss. 8, 94 So. 2d 624 (1957);
Custy & Brand, "Future Interests--The Mississippi Two Donee Statute and the Common Law Rule Against Perpetuities," 30 Miss. LJ. 221 (1959); Note, 28 Miss. L.J. 88

(1956).

60 La. Const. art. IV, § 16 (1954); La. Rev. Stat. §§ 9.1794 (1950); 5 Powell, Real
Property ff 817 (1956).
61 Minn. Stat. Ann. §§ 501.11, 501.13, 501.195, 501.20, 502.73 (1947 & Supp. 1959); 5
Powell, Real Property ff 819 (1956).
62 S.D. Code §§ 51.0231, 51.0232, 51.0411, 51.0418, 59.0315, 59.0316, 59.034 (1939); 5
Powell, Real Property ff 825 (1956); Phipps, "Perpetuities in South Dakota," 1 S.D.L. Rev.
1 (1956).
63 Mont. Rev. Codes Ann. § 67-406 (Supp. 1959).
64 Idaho Code Ann. § 55-111 (1957).
65 Wis. Stat. § 230.15 (1959).
66 Law Reform Comm., Fourth Report (The Rule Against Perpetuities), Cmd. No. 18
at 7 & 30 (1956).
67 See In re Villar [1929] 1 Ch. 243; Re Leverhulme [1943] 2 All E.R. 274.
68 See Powell, "Changes in the New York Statutes on Perpetuities and Accumulations:
A Report and a Proposal," 58 Colum. L. Rev. 1196, 1205 (1958); 5 Powell, Real Property
f 807A (1959 Supp.); Simes, Public Policy and the Dead Hand, 69-70 (1955).
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by Professor Powell,6 9 are illustrative of limitations held invalid in
New York which would have been upheld if a twenty-one-year period
in gross had been permitted: Beekman v. Bonsor (fifteen years);7
Garvey v. McDevitt (four years);" 1 Henderson v. Henderson (five
years); 7 Smith v. Chesebrough (two years); 73 Matter of Hitchcock
(five years); 74 Matter of Roe (two years) .7
It is true that the result in many of these cases could have been
avoided by more careful draftsmanship. The fact remains that most
testators, and unfortunately some lawyers, were unfamiliar with the
intricacies of the New York law on this subject, with the consequence
that perfectly innocent testamentary dispositions, which would be valid
almost everywhere else, have been frustrated in New York.7 6 This was
especially the case where the will was originally drawn in another state
but the testator died domiciled in New York. Professor Powell cites
several such cases.7 7 It seemed unreasonable that New York should be
out of line with almost every other jurisdiction in this regard.
Two questions however remained: (a) Should the period in gross be in
addition to multiple lives, or alternative thereto? (b) Should it be
twenty-one years or a longer period?
On the first question, it was decided to recommend a period in
addition to, rather than alternative to, multiple lives, for the following
reasons:
(a) If an alternative period in gross were authorized, it would still
be desirable to delete the provision for a restricted minority and substitute a period measured by an actual minority or minorities, in
addition to multiple lives. This seemed unnecessarily complicated.
(b) At the time of the 1936 and 1938 recommendations of the commission, proposing an alternative period, there were three jurisdictions,
California, North Dakota, and Oklahoma, which so provided. All three
have since changed this feature of their law to substitute an additional
period in gross.
(c) The 1959 actions of the legislature and the Governor indicated
6 5 Powell, Real Property
800 (1956); See also Whiteside, "Suspension of the Power
of Alienation in New York," 13 Cornell L.Q. 31, 67 (1927).
70 23 N.Y. 298 (1861).
71 72 N.Y. 556 (1878).
72 113 N.Y. 1, 20 N.E. 814 (1889).
73 176 N.Y. 317, 68 N.E. 625 (1903).
74 222 N.Y. 57, 118 N.E. 220 (1917).
75 281 N.Y. 541, 24 N.E.2d 322 (1939), 49 Yale LJ. 1112 (1940).
76 See S Powell, Real Property II 800 (1956).
77 Guaranty Trust Co. v. Goetting, 185 N.Y. Supp. 663 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1921);
Woolley v. Hutchins, 114 Misc. 11, 186 N.Y. Supp. 769 (Sup. Ct. Erie County 1920),
aff'd 198 App. Div. 964, 189 N.Y. Supp. 959 (4th Dep't 1921); Matter of Green, 167 N.Y.
Supp. 1084 (Surr. Ct. N.Y. County 1917).
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that favorable action could probably be had on a recommendation for
an additional period in gross.
Of course, authorization of an additionalperiod of twenty-one years
in gross, does not preclude the use of a flat period not in excess of
twenty-one years, without any reference to lives in being. This is the
common-law rule, universally recognized.78
On the second question, it was decided to recommend a period of
twenty-one years, rather than a longer period, for the following reasons:
(a) In general, it was believed undesirable to recommend changes in
the New York law which went beyond the common law.
(b) Any extension of the permissible period would affect not only
the possible duration of trusts and the time for vesting of future interests,
but also the period during which income may be lawfully accumulated,
under the 1959 amendments to the Real Property Law, section 61, and
to the Personal Property Law, section 16. It was not believed that
accumulations (except perhaps for charitable and similar purposes)
should be authorized beyond the common-law perpetuities period.
(c) Only two other states, Idaho and Wisconsin, now authorize a
period in gross longer than twenty-one years.
(d) The justification commonly given for a period longer than twentyone years is that under modern conditions young people are not always
prepared to assume full control of large amounts of property on attaining
their legal majority and for that reason many testators desire to tie
property up until the ultimate beneficiaries are twenty-five or even
thirty. Although this is a plausible consideration, it has been pointed
out that it would actually apply only to a small fraction of cases, namely
those involving grandchildren taking interests at some time after the
end of all designated lives in being. Even here, a testator could in most
cases accomplish his purpose by providing for a continuance of the trust
and distribution to the grandchildren at, say, age thirty or twenty-one
years after the death of the last beneficiary living at the date of his
death, whichever alternative should happen first. 79
Accordingly, the commission recommended that section 42 of the
Real Property Law and section 11 of the Personal Property Law be
amended to delete the restricted minority provisions and to substitute "a
term of not more than twenty-one years," in addition to lives in being
at the creation of the estate or interest. It was also recommended that
78 6 American Law of Property § 24.14 (Casner ed. 1952); 3 Simes & Smith, Law of
Future Interests § 1225 (2d ed. 1956); Leach, "Perpetuities in a Nutshell," 51 Harv. L.
Rev. 638, 641 (Example A-1) (1938).
79 Schuyler, "Should the Rule Against Perpetuities Discard Its Vest?" 56 Mich. L. Rev.
683, 710-11 (1958).

CORNELL LAW QUARTERLY

[Vol. 45

sections 178 and 179 of the Real Property. Law, relating to the validity
of interests created by the exercise of powers of appointment, be amended
to include appropriate reference to the new period.8 0
These recommendations were adopted and enacted into law by chapter
448 of the Laws of 1960. The act took effect on April 12, 1960. It applies
to all estates and interests created by instruments taking effect on or
after that date, including instruments in execution of a power reserved
or created before that date. Estates and interests created by instruments
taking effect prior to April 12, 1960, continue to be governed by the
old law. The commission saw no reason to recommend a postponed
effective date, 8' but on the other hand did not think it wise to recommend
82
a retroactive date.

IV.

CONSTRUCTION OF LIMITATIONS WHICH ARE PRimA FACIE INVALID

Much of the recent criticism of the common-law Rule Against Perpetuities has been directed at the harsh workings of the certainty of
vesting rule, coupled with the raising of certain artificial presumptions
and the citing of extremely remote possibilities, e.g., the presumption
that any person of any age or physical condition is capable of having
issue, the possibility that a man's "widow" may turn out to be a person
not in being when the gift took effect, the possibility that a will may
not be probated within twenty-one years, and so on. In a number of
classical cases, perfectly reasonable dispositions have been held invalid
because of remote possibilities of this sort. New York does not seem to
have been particularly troubled by such cases, probably because they
were overshadowed by the harsh working of the two-lives rule. But the
rules applied in these cases were presumably law in New York and it
was possible that they might assume increased importance under the
new multiple lives rule.
The existence of this body of cases has been the principal argument
in support of "wait-and-see" legislation.8 3 But it has been pointed out
that less drastic surgery would cure most of the alleged ills. Adoption
of a series of presumptions against such remote possibilities would remove many of the difficulties without any basic change in the philosophy
of the common-law rule. 4
80 N.Y. Leg. Doc. No. 65(G) (1960), reprinted in 1960 McKinney's Sess. Law News
of N.Y., No. 4, pp. A-114-15 (Mar. 25, 1960).
81 1960 McKinney's Sess. Law News of N.Y., No. 4, at A-118.
82 Ibid.
83 See, e.g., ABA Section on Real Property, Probate and Trust Law, Legislators' Handbook on Perpetuities, 5-7, 24-29 (1958).
84 Id. at 8, 34, 36.
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Conclusive Presumption of Fertility

Absurd results have been reached (or barely avoided) in a few cases
by applying an absolute presumption of fertility to persons of very
advanced age, 5 or to very young children.86 Such results have sometimes
been avoided by construing the will to exclude such possibilities as a
matter of the testator's intention,8 7 or by ruling that offspring of very
young children would be illegitimate as a matter of law and therefore not
qualified to take."8 Other suggested remedies are adoption of a statute
or judge-made rule (i) raising a presumption that persons under or
over certain ages are incapable of procreation, or (ii) permitting introduction of medical testimony on the possibility of procreation, or (iii)
combining both these provisions.
There are some caveats here which should be considered. One is the
obvious fact that persons who are unable to have children of their own
can still adopt children. It is true that under the present law of New
York adopted children do not have all the rights of inheritance through
their adoptive parents that natural children have, and are not included
in the phrase "lawful issue" unless such was the intention of the
testator.89 But it has been held that an adopted child who was known
to the testator is included in the term "lawful issue" in the absence of
a contrary intention. 0 (Of course this would not present a perpetuities
problem, since such an adopted child would by hypothesis be "in being.")
Moreover, there is always the possibility that the adoption statutes of
New York might be broadened to broaden the rights of inheritance of
adopted children. This has happened recently in Massachusetts, New
Jersey, and PennsylvaniaY1
Secondly, with advances in medical science, while more is known
about problems of fertility, it is becoming less certain than ever that in
any given case the possibility of procreation is absolutely excluded. In
this connection, there seems to have been no discussion in the literature
of the possible impact of artificial insemination on the rule against per85 Jee v. Audley, 1 Cox 324, 29 Eng. Rep. 1186 (Ch. 1787).
86 Re Gaite's Will Trusts [1949] 1 All E.R. 459.
87 In re Wright's Estate, 284 Pa. 334, 131 At. 188 (1925).
88 Re Gaite's Will Trusts, supra note 86.
89 N.Y. Dom. Rel. Law § 115. See Matter of Ward, 14 Misc. 2d 903, 180 N.Y.S.2d 429
(Surr. Ct. Westchester County 1958); Matter of Smith, 14 Misc. 2d 205, 177 N.Y.S.2d 280
(Surr. Ct. Nassau County 1958); Matter of Cook, 8 Misc. 2d 103, 165 N.Y.S.2d 806
(Surr. Ct. Westchester County 1957); Matter of Price, 4 Misc. 2d 1023, 163 N.Y.S.2d 34
(Surr. Ct. Westchester County 1956).
90 Matter of Upjohn, 304 N.Y. 366, 107 N.E.2d 492 (1952); Matter of Camp, 6 Misc.
2d 593, 161 N.Y.S.2d 252 (Surr. Ct. N.Y. County 1957).

91 Mass. Ann. Laws c. 210, § 8 (Supp. 1959); N.J. Stat. Ann. 9:3-30(B) (Supp. 1959);
Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 20, § 180.14(6) (Purdon Supp. 1958). See generally Note, 31 Notre
Dame Law. 451 (1956); Annot., 70 A.L.R. 621 (1931).
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petuities, although its other legal ramifications have been explored at
some length. 2
2.

The "Unborn Widow"
The problem here is that a will which is not skillfully drafted may
create a trust for the "widow" of a beneficiary, without designating her
by name, or make a gift contingent on the death of someone's unnamed
"widow." It is possible that the named beneficiary's present wife (if any)
may die and that he may remarry someone not in being when the
testator died, who might then become the "widow" mentioned in the
will. This could void the gift. 3 This result has been avoided by a process
of construction, i.e., it will be presumed that the testator meant the
word "widow" to refer only to his son's present wife." In at least one
case the problem, though present, was overlooked by counsel and the
court. 5 That the possibility is not altogether fanciful is demonstrated
by Matter of Vingut,96 which involved a real unborn widow, although
this did not void the gift on the facts of that case.
The difficulty could be avoided, in most situations, by a statute
adopting the presumption mentioned above.
3. The "Administration Contingency"
The difficulty here arises when a gift is made contingent upon an event,
most commonly the probate of a will, which will probably, but by remote
possibility may not, take place within the common law permissible
period of lives in being and twenty-one years. Since it is usually not
possible to relate such event to any particular life in being, the question
is whether the event must necessarily take place within twenty-one
years.
One jurisdiction, Connecticut (before its present "wait-and-see"
statute), had a judge-made rule that it would be"deemed that a will
would be probated within a "reasonable time" (e.g.,'less than seven
years)."' Illinois by statute allows a permissible period measured by
admission of a will to probate."
The problem can be ameliorated, although not completely solved, by
a statute listing the administration contingencies most apt to be selected
and raising a presumption that they will happen within the permissible
period.
92 See, e.g., Weinberger, "A Partial Solution to Legitimacy Problems Arising from the
Use of Artificial Insemination," 35 Ind. L.J. 143 (1960).
93 Matter of Milhau, 151 Misc. 283, 271 N.Y. Supp. 214 (Surr. Ct. Kings County 1934).
94 Matter of Friend, 283 N.Y. 200, 28 N.E.2d 377 (1940).
95 In re Stevenson's Trust, 127 N.Y.S.2d 626 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1954).
96 10 Misc. 2d 160, 172 N.Y.S.2d 32 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1958).
97 Belfield v. Booth, 63 Conn. 299, 27 Ati. 585 (1893).
98 i1. Ann. Stat., ch. 30, § 153a (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1959).
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4. Reduction of Age Contingencies
At common law it often happens that a gift is invalid because conditioned upon a child reaching some age beyond twenty-one. This may
be more than twenty-one years after any life in being. This has an
especially severe impact on class gifts, where the rule is that if there is
any possibility that the interest of any member of the class may not
vest indefeasibly within the permissible period, then the entire class
gift is void. 9
A solution is to apply a kind of cy pres to the will or other granting
instrument and reduce any such age contingency to twenty-one where
necessary to save the gift. This was done by judicial fiat in Edgerly
v. Barker.1 0 Statutory authorization for such action is found in the
English Law of Property Act of 1925,101 and in the recent Massachu-

setts, Connecticut, and Main legislation." 2
5. Recommendations of the Law Revision Commission
The commission decided to make no recommendation on the presumption of fertility. On the problems of the "unborn widow" and the
administration contingency, the commission recommended legislation
which would raise a presumption that the creator of the interest intended to comply with the Rule Against Perpetuities. °3 With respect to
age contingencies, the commission recommended legislation similar to the
Massachusetts, Maine, and Connecticut statutes.104
These recommendations were adopted and are reflected in chapter
452 of the Laws of 1960. Effective April 12, 1960, this statute does the
following:
(a) Adds a new section, 42-b, to the Real Property Law, reading:
§ 42-b. Reduction of age contingency. Where an estate or interest
would, except for this section, be invalid because made to depend either
for its vesting or for its duration upon any person attaining or failing to
attain an age in excess of twenty-one years, the age contingency shall be

reduced to twenty-one years as to all persons subject to the same age
contingency.

(b) Adds a new section, 11-a, to the Personal Property Law, almost
identical it wording.
99 Leake v. Robinson, 2 Mer. 363, 35 Eng. Rep. 979 Ch. 1817).
100 66 N.H. 434, 31 AUt. 900 (1891).

101 15 & 16 Geo. 5, c. 20, § 163, 20 Halsbury, Stats. Eng. 770 (2d ed. 1950).
102 Conn. Gen. Stat. § 45-96 (1958); Mass. Ann. Laws ch. 184A, § 2 (1955); Me. Rev.

Stat. Ann. § 28 (Supp. 1959).
103 N.Y. Leg. Doc. No. 65(G)

(1960), reprinted in 1960 McKinney's Sess. Law News

of N.Y., No. 4, p. A-117-18 (Mar. 25, 1960).
104

1960 McKinney's Sess. Law News of N.Y., id. at A-117.
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(c) Adds a new section, 42-c, to the Real Property Law, reading:
§ 42-c. Determination of period of suspension of absolute power of
alienation by instrument creating estate or interest; rules of construction.
1. In the construction of an instrument by which an estate or interest is
created, the rules of construction provided in this section shall govern for
the purpose of ascertaining the intention of the person by whom the
estate or interest was created with respect to matters determining the
period during which the absolute power of alienation is suspended by such
estate or interest.
2. It shall be presumed that such person intended the estate or interest
to be valid.
3. Where an estate or interest would, except for this subdivision, be
invalid because of the possibility that the person to whom it is given or
limited may be a person not in being at the time of the creation of the
estate or interest, and such person is described in the instrument as the
spouse of another person, without other identification, it shall be presumed, unless a contrary intention appears, that such phrase was intended
to refer to a person in being on the effective date of the instrument.
4. Where the duration or vesting of an estate or interest is conditioned
upon the probate of a will, the appointment of an executor or trustee, the
location of an heir, the payment of debts, the sale of assets, the settlement
of an estate, or the determination of questions relating to estate or transfer tax, or the happening of any like contingency, it shall be presumed that
the person who created the estate or interest intended that such contingency must occur, if at all, within twenty-one years from the effective date
of the instrument.
(d) Adds a new section, 11-b, to the Personal Property Law, to the
same effect but with minor changes in wording.
The following comments seem pertinent:
(a) The provision for reduction. of age contingencies, although
applicable only where necessary to save an otherwise invalid interest, is
mandatory in those instances. While this has been criticized as involving
a rewriting of the instrument and a possible frustration of the testator's
intent, similar legislation has been in effect in England since 1925,105
in Massachusetts since 1954,106 and in Connecticut 10

7

and Maine'08

since 1955, apparently without widespread objection on this score. Presumably the average testator or settlor would prefer to see his wishes
carried out in part rather than frustrated in toto.'0 9
(b) The remainder of the statute, raising presumptions as to intent,
although it follows a pattern often recommended, is new so far as actual
legislative enactment (with minor exceptions) is concerned.1 0
105
106
107
108
109

Supra note 101.
Supra note 102.
Ibid.
Ibid.

Cf. Opinion of Chief justice Doe in Edgerly v. Barker, 66 N.H. 434, 31 Atl. 900
(1891).
110 As noted above, Illinois has such a statute, limited to the probate of a will. Supra
note 98.

1960]

PERPETUITIESAND POWERS OF APPOINTMENT

703

(c) There is a basic presumption that the creator of the interest
intended a valid gift. This replaces the traditional canon of neutrality,
that the instrument is first to be construed without regard to the rule
against perpetuities, and then the rule is to be applied "remorselessly.""'ll
(d) The presumptions serve to define the terms of the gift, and are
not presumptions as to what will or will not happen as a matter of fact.
In other words, they operate to read into the gift such saving language
as "provided such spouse is a life in being," or "provided such event
happens within twenty-one years," language which a careful draftsman would insert in any event. If the remote contingency should happen, as where the spouse turns out to be an unborn widow after all, or
the will is not in fact probated for twenty-five years, the gift by its own
implied terms would fail to take effect," 2 , and this would be resolved
within the permissible period.
(e) The term "spouse" was intended by the draftsman to embrace
such terms as "wife," "widow," "husband," "widower," or any other
word of like import." 8
(f) These presumptions are to be invoked only for the purpose of
determining the governing perpetuities period; if no perpetuities problem is present, the statute is inapplicable.
(g) The presumption that the word "spouse" was intended to refer
to a living person is not to be applied where a contrary intention
appears.
One caveat should be noted. Because of technical difficulties in drafting, the statutory presumption concerning the intended meaning of the
word "spouse" is applicable only where such spouse is a person to whom
an estate or interest is given or limited. If the "spouse" is a measuring
life but takes no interest, literally the statute would not apply. Such a
case is not apt to arise," 4 but if it should the court would still be free
to apply the presumption without the aid of a statute, and would have
judicial precedent for doing so."'
111 Gray, Rule Against Perpetuities § 629, at 599 (4th ed. 1942).
112 Unless its wording permitted the construction, say, that the gift was to take effect in

any event upon the expiration of 21 years.
113 N.Y. Leg. Doc. No. 65(G) (1960), reprinted in 1960 McKinney's Sess. Law News
of N.Y., No. 4, p. A-118 (Mar. 25, 1960).
114 In nearly all cases, the widow would be the beneficiary of a trust and thus would
take an "interest" which might be invalid if the presumption of the statute were not

applied.

115 Matter of Friend, supra note 94.
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FURTHER CHANGES-POWERS OF APPOINTMENT

The New York statutory system of powers, adopted by the Revisers
in 1830 and subsequently amended from time to time, is set forth in
article 5 of the Real Property Law, sections 130-183. It differs in many
respects from the common law system of powers. Consideration of it as
whole was beyond the scope of the study undertaken by the author for
the Law Revision Commission. It did seem desirable, however, to consider the relationship between powers of appointment and the statutes
against suspension of the power of alienation and against accumulations.

The basic provisions are set forth in section 178 and 179 of the Real
Property Law. As noted above,"' these sections were amended in 1959.
The amendments provided that, while the principle of relation back
would continue to govern, the newer and more liberal permissible period
should control whenever the power was exercised after September 1,
1958, even though the power was created prior to that date."

7

The

amendments left a number of questions unanswered, namely:
(1) The scope of the doctrine of relation back;
(2) The applicability of the doctrine of the "second look";
(3) The relationship between the doctrine of relation back and the
liberalized rule on accumulations.
Scope of Relation Back in New York
The 1959 amendments did not change the New York rule on the scope
of the doctrine of relation back, applied in determining the validity of
an interest given or limited by the exercise of a power of appointment.
In most common law jurisdictions the doctrine is applied to all special
powers, and to general testamentary powers, but not to general powers
presently exercisable. In the case of the latter the perpetuities period
is measured from the date of exercise, without relation back." 8 The
theory is that the holder of a general power presently exercisable has
substantially all the rights of ownership, and the policy reasons for
applying the doctrine of relation back do not apply. A minority American view, which is also followed in England and Ireland, goes further
and applies the doctrine of relation back only to special powers, and
not to general powers, whether testamentary or presently exercisable. 1 9
1.

16 See text p. 684 supra.
117 It must be remembered, however, that the measuring lives have to be lives which
were in being at the time the power was created.
118 Mifflin's Appeal, 121 Pa. 205, 15 At]. 525 (1888); 6 American Law of Property §
24.34 (Casner ed. 1952); 5 Powell, Real Property ff 787 (1956); 3 Simes & Smith, Law of
Future Interests § 1275 (2d ed. 1956).
119 Miller v. Douglass, 192 Wis. 486, 213 N.W. 320 (1927); Rous v. Jackson, L.R. 29
Ch. Div. 521 (1885); 6 American Law of Property § 24.34 (Casner ed. 1952); 5 Powell,
Real Property ff 788 (1956) ; 3 Simes & Smith, Law of Future Interests § 1275 (2d ed. 1956).
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Neither exception, as such, was clearly applicable by the statute law
of New York. Section 178 of the Real Property Law drew no distinction and, if the statute was read literally, the permissible period had to
be measured from the date of creation of the power in all cases.12 ° But
the cases indicated that the doctrine of relation back was not applicable
to an "absolute power of disposition" given to the owner of a particular estate for life or for years which is changed into a fee absolute
under section 149 of the Real Property Law, or to a "power of disposition" which is considered a fee under sections 150-151 of the Real
Property Law.' 2 ' However, the cases indicate this only by way of dictum. Moreover, it has been held that section 149 of the Real Property
Law has no application to a power of appointment accompanied by a
trust. 22 It seemed desirable to clarify the New York law on this point.
Minnesota, which has a statutory system of powers based originally
on the New York Revised Statutes of 1830, in 1943 amended its statute
on this point to read as follows:
Right of alienation suspended, where
The period during which the absolute right of alienation may be suspended by any instrument in execution of a power is to be computed from
the time of the creation of the power and not from the date of the instrument, except that in the case of a general power presently
2 3 exercisable, the
period is to be computed from the date of the instrument.
Professor Powell calls this a drastic but wise revision. 24
The Law Revision Committee recommended a similar amendment
for New York, to become a ne* section, 179-a, of the Real Property
Law. This was enacted by chapter 450 of the Laws of 1960, effective
April 12, 1960. The new section reads as follows:
§ 179-a. Computation of term of suspension in the case of absolute
powers of disposition granted or reserved.
1. Notwithstanding section one hundred seventy-eight and section one
hundred seventy-nine of this chapter, the period during which the absolute power of alienation of real property or the absolute ownership of
personal property may be suspended by an instrument in execution of an
absolute power of disposition exercisable at any time after the creation of
the power shall not be computed from the time of the creation of the
power but shall be computed from the date such instrument takes effect
unless subdivision two of this section is applicable.
2. Where an absolute power of disposition exercisable at any time is
reserved by a grantor, the period during which the absolute power of alien120 See 6 American Law of Property § 5.13, at 197 (Casner ed. 1952); Walsh, Future
Estates in New York § 27, at 161 (1931).
121 Farmers' Loan & Trust Co. v. Kip, 192 N.Y. 266, 276-77, 85 N.E. 59, 62 (1908).
322 Farmers' Loan & Trust Co. v. Kip, supra note 121; Cutting v. Cutting, 86 N.Y. 522
(1881) ; 3 Powell, Real Property ff 390, at 316 (1952).
123 Minn. Stat. Ann. § 502.73 (1947).
124 5 Powell, Real Property 1 819, at 807 (1956).
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ation of real property or the absolute ownership of personal property may
be suspended shall be computed from the date upon which said reserved
power terminates, whether by reason of the death of the grantor, release
or otherwise.
It should be noted that subsection (1) of this statute refers not to a
"power of appointment" but to "an absolute power of disposition." This
is defined in section 153 of the Real Property Law as follows:
§ 153. When power of disposition absolute
Every power of disposition by means of which the grantee is enabled, in
his lifetime, to dispose of the entire fee for his own benefit, is deemed
absolute.
This would of course include a general beneficial power of appointment
(as thoise terms are defined in sections 134 and 136 of the Real Property Law) which is presently exercisable.
(The term "grantee" is
defined in section 132 of the Real Property Law as "designating the person in whom the power is vested, whether by grant, devise, or reservation"). Presumably it would not include a power accompanied by a
trust because ordinarily the beneficiary of the trust would have no
power to terminate the trust and convey the entire fee.
Subsection (2) of the statute is intended to preserve the existing
rule that, where a grantor has reserved an absolute power of disposition
in himself, it is not necessary to apply the rule against suspension of
the power of *alienation, or of absolute ownership, so long as such absolute power of disposition remains effective. 125 A person having such
a reserved power of disposition is in substantially the same position as
an outright owner.
It is probable that this statute serves only to clarify what is now
the law in any event. The commission in its recommendation to the
legislature stated that it was "designed to settle rather than change the
law, and no provision is included to limit [its] application to interests
26
created after the effective date of the amendments."
2.

Doctrine of tke "Second Look"
This doctrine, which is recognized in most common-law jurisdictions,
ameliorates somewhat the rigors of the rule of relation back. Under the
"second look" doctrine, not only the terms of the instrument exercising
the power are related back to the time of its creation, but also the facts
125 Morgan v. Keyes, 302 N.Y. 439, 99 N.E.2d 230 (1951); City Bank Farmers Trust
Co. v. Cannon, 291 N.Y. 125, 133, 51 N.E.2d 674, 676 (1943); Schenectady Trust Co. v.

Emmons, 261 App. Div. 154, 160, 25 N.YS.2d 230, 235 (3d Dep't), afl'd, Mem. 286 N.Y.
626, 36 N.E.2d 461 (1941).

126 N.Y. Leg. Doc. No. 65(G) (1960),
of N.Y., No. 4, p. A-118 (Mar. 25, 1960).

reprinted in 1960 McKinney's Sess. Law News

1960]

PERPETUITIESAND POWERS OF APPOINTMENT

707

and circumstances existing at the time of its exercise. This means that,
in considering the validity of an interest given by the exercise of a
power, possible events which might have invalidated the interest if the
latter were viewed wholly prospectively from the time of creation of
the power, but which have not happened at the time of its exercise,
and cannot thereafter happen, may be disregarded.11 7 (It should be
emphasized that this is not the same as "wait-and-see," with which it
is sometimes confused.)
It is generally recognized that this is a desirable amelioration of
the rigors of the strict rule of relation back as applied to the rule against
perpetuities and powers of appointment. It serves to validate many
interests which otherwise would be invalid. It does not violate the
policy of the certainty of vesting rule, namely, that validity of an interest must be determined at the creation of the interest in the light of all
possibilities without regard to the subsequent course of events. This is
because in the case of a power of appointment it is necessary to wait
until the power is exercised before one knows what interest is being
created. There is no occasion to apply the certainty of vesting rule
until it is known what the interest is, and therefore there can be no
objection to disregarding contingencies which may have existed when
the power was created but which have been resolved by the time the
power is exercised. 2
There seems to have been no decision of the Court of Appeals which
squarely repudiates the doctrine of the "second look," but neither is
there any which has clearly adopted it as the law of New York. It can
be argued that the doctrine was recognized in Hillen v. Iselin,29 but
repudiated in Bishop v. Bishop, 3 ° but neither case is clear-cut on the
question. There are a number of lower court cases invalidating gifts
which could have been saved if the doctrine had been invoked; instead,
it was not even discussed.3 ' On the other hand, the doctrine was ap33
32
A recent case, In re Patterson's Will,
plied in Matter of Dodge.
upheld a gift under the two lives rule, apparently by applying the
127 6 American Law of Property § 24.35 (Casner ed. 1952); 5 Powell, Real Property
at 655-57 (1956); 3 Simes & Smith, Law of Future Interests § 1274, at 211-12
(2d ed. 1956).
128 Gray, Rule Against Perpetuities §§ 523-523.6 (4th ed. 1942); 5 Powell, Real Property
§ 788, at 657 (1956) ; Restatement, Property § 392, comment a (1944).
129 144 N.Y. 365, 39 N.E. 368 (1895).
130 257 N.Y. 40, 177 N.E. 302 (1931).
131 Matter of Baiter, 152 Misc. 177, 273 N.Y. Supp. 962 (Surr. Ct. Suffolk County
1934); Matter of Hayman, 134 Misc. 803, 237 N.Y. Supp. 215 (Surr. Ct. N.Y. County
1929). Cf. In re Fuller's Will, 131 N.Y.S.2d 402 (Surr. Ct. Westchester County 1954). See
6 American Law of Property § 25.13, p. 197 (Casner ed. 1952) ; Sparks, "Future Interests,"
24 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 1222-24 (1949); Note, 21 Cornell L.Q. 646 (1936).

11788,

132 129 Misc. 390, 222 N.Y. Supp. 247 (Surr. Ct. N.Y. County 1927).

133 162 N.Y.S.2d 446 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1957).
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"second look" doctrine. At least one of the treatises regards this case
as authority for the "second look" doctrine in New York.'3 4
There is no authority in New York for applying the "second look"
doctrine to a gift in default of appointment, as the Supreme Court of
Massachusetts did in Sears v. Coolidge.35 Application of the doctrine in
this situation is supported by Morris and Leach in their text, Rule
Against Perpetuities.136 But they cite only Sears v. Coolidge, and have
to rely on the arugment that there is no inconsistent authority. The
same position was taken by Professor Leach in 1952 in the American
Law of Property, but his co-author, Mr. Tudor, dissented."'T The 1958
Supplement to this work notes Sears v. Coolidge as supporting Professor
18
Leach's view.1
Whether the doctrine should be made the subject of a statute is
another question. No statute has been found in any other jurisdiction
which specifically incorporates it. The doctrine as its stands is entirely
judge-made. It has not been expressly repudiated by any court. It has
been suggested that the few decisions in which it was not applied where
it might have been were the result of inadvertence. 139 This certainly
seems to be true of the New York cases. Moreover, the doctrine seems
to be one which readily lends itself to application under a multiple lives
rule. It is much easier to overlook it in applying the rigorous two-lives
rule. This may explain the apparent conflict in the New York cases.
The study made by the author pointed out that, because of the very
nature of the problem and the difficulty of explaining the true scope of
the doctrine, any statute on the subject might be misunderstood and
might give rise to unforeseen problems. He did however suggest the
matter for the consideration of the commission, and the commission
decided to recommend a new section, 179-b, to be added to the Real
Property Law. This recommendation was adopted and the new section
enacted by chapter 451 of the Laws of 1960, effective April 12, 1960.
The section reads:
§ 179-b. Rule for determining whether estate or interest would have
been valid if given or limited at time of creation of power. In applying
section forty-two of this chapter and section eleven of the personal property
law to an estate or interest given or limited by an instrument in execution
of a power, facts and circumstances existing at the effective date of the
134 3 Simes & Smith, Law of Future Interests § 1420 (Supp. 1959).
135 329 Mass. 340, 108 N.E.2d 563 (1952).

136 Morris & Leach, Rule Against Perpetuities 152-55 (1956).
137 6 American Law of Property § 24.36, at 104 (Casner ed. 1952).
138 Id. (Supp. 1958).
139 6 American Law of Property § 24.35, p. 101 (Casner ed. 1952); Gray, Rule Against
Perpetuities § 523.2 & n.3 (4th ed. 1942).
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instrument in execution of the power shall be taken into account, notwithstanding that the period during which the absolute power of alienation of
real property or the absolute ownership of personal property may be suspended under such sections must be computed from the time of the creation of the power.
In recommending the new section the commission made the same
observation as in the case of section 179-a, that it was intended to settle
rather than to change the law, and that accordingly no provision was
included to limit its application to interests created after the effective
date of the amendment.1 40
Powers of Appointment and Accumulations
Under Real Property Law, section 61, as amended, and Personal
Property Law, section 16, as amended, it is now possible to provide
for accumulation of rents, profits, or income, so long as such accumulation is directed to commence within the time allowed for the vesting
of future estates (or suspension of the absolute ownership of personal
property) and to terminate at or before the expiration of such time.
Prior to the effective date of the 1959 amendments, accumulations
(with certain exceptions) were subject to two further limitations: (a)
they could be directed only for the benefit of one or more minors then
in being, for the period of their minority, or (b) if directed to begin
at a future time, they had to begin and end within the perpetuities
period and, again, could only be for the benefit of one or more minors
during the period of their minority. In situation (b), two different
periods might apply, depending on whether the accumulation was
directed by an instrument taking effect before September 1, 1958, when
the perpetuities period was two lives in being plus a restricted minority,
or on or after September 1, 1958, when the period was multiple lives
41
in being plus a restricted minority.'
3.

No particular problem arose when the accumulation was directed by
an ordinary instrument passing property which took effect on or after
September 1, 1959. But when the instrument was one which passed
property by the exercise of a power of appointment created prior to
September 1, 1959, a problem was created by the wording of Real
Property Law, section 179. Before the 1960 amendments, this read
as follows:
140 N.Y. Leg. Doc. No. 65 (G) (1960), reprinted in 1960 McKinney's Sess. Law News of
N.Y., No. 4, p. A-118 (Mar. 25, 1960).
141 A further complication might arise in the case of an instrument taking effect before
September 1, 1958, but directing an accumulation for the benefit of a minor to begin after
September 1, 1958. Would the overall limiting period be two lives or multiple lives? The
statute does not provide an answer. It may be assumed that such a case would be very
rare.
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An estate or interest can not be given or limited to any person by an
instrument in execution of a power unless it would have been valid
if given or limited at the time of the creation of the power, provided,
however, that the permissible number of lives under section forty-two of
this chapter and under section eleven of the personal property law shall
be determined under the law in effect at the time of the execution of the
power and not the law in effect at the time of the creation of the power.
The statute, both before and after the 1959 amendment, was silent on
the subject of accumulations and its effect on a provision directing an
accumulation was uncertain. A hypothetical example will pose the
problem more clearly.
Donor H, by a will taking effect on January 1, 1950, created a trust
for the benefit of his wife W for her life, remainder as she should by
will appoint. The donee, W, died December 1, 1959, exercising the
power of appointment by creating a further trust for the benefit of
the three children of H and W, A, B, and C, to last until the death of
the longest liver, with a provision for accumulation of income for each
child until he or she reached twenty-five. When W died, A was twentytwo, B and C were still minors. Under the law in effect in 1950, when
the power was created, the secondary trust would be bad because, when
added to the primary trust, it would suspend the power of alienation
for four lives. 142 Under the law in effect in December, 1959, when the
power was exercised, the secondary trust would be good, because even
when the interest is related back to 1950, the two trusts together suspend the power of alienation for only four (a reasonable number)
lives, all of which were in being in 1950 (the children of H and W
necessarily had to be in being when H died). The amended statutes
(Real Property Law, sections 178 and 179) permit use in such a case
of the measuring period in effect in December, 1959, although still
requiring that the period be measured from 1950.
But what of the direction for accumulation? Under 1950 law it would
(i) be bad as to B and C, because extending beyond the minority of
those two minor children (although bad only as to the excess), and (ii)
wholly bad as to A because not for the benefit of a minor. If related
back to 1950, it might also be bad because not directed to begin and
end within two lives in being (unless each share was treated separately).
Under 1959 law it would be good, even when related back, because
142 The secondary trust might be saved, in part, by invoking the doctrine of separable
trusts, dividing the trust into three shares, for A, B, and C, respectively, and releasing each
share on the death of the life beneficiary. See Matter of Goldstein; 3 App. Div. 2d 16, 157
N.Y.S.2d 778 (2d Dep't 1956), motion for leave to appeal denied, 3 N.Y.2d 705, 142 N.E.2d
430, 160 N.Y.S.2d 828 (1957); Matter of Homer, 237 N.Y. 489, 143 N.E. 655 (1924). But
this was not what testatrix provided, and it would involve fairly drastic surgery.
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directed to begin and end within four lives, all of which were in being
in 1950.
It could be argued that there was no requirement that the validity
of the provision for accumulation be determined under the law of 1950,
and since it was to begin and end within the permissible period, and
was incident to a trust otherwise valid, it should be upheld. On the
other hand, a strict reading of the statutory language, "An estate or
interest can not be given or limited to any person by an instrument in
execution of a power unless it would have been valid if given or limited
at the time of the creation of the power,"' 43 so as to include a direction
for accumulation, would result in a holding of invalidity. This would
be true even under the statute as amended in 1959.
Although no New York case was found squarely in point, two cases
which appear relevant indicated that the New York courts might well
have taken the latter, and stricter, view.
In Dempsey v. Tylee,1 44 the creator of the power was a married
woman. Under the law then in effect, a married woman was not permitted to convey or devise her real property to her husband, so as to
cut off her heirs at law. Apparently in order to circumvent this rule,
the wife united with the husband in a deed to a trustee, reserving a
power to appoint the property by will. By her will she then exercised
the power by appointing the property to her husband.
A majority of the three-judge court stated that this was invalid,
relying inter alia on the statute which preceded section 179 of the
Real Property Law (1 Rev. Stat. 737, section 129), which then read:
"No estate or interest can be given or limited to any person, by an
instrument in execution of a power which such person would not have
been capable of taking, under the instrument by which the power was
granted."
Writing for the majority, Justice Bosworth said:
I do not understand the prohibition of this section to refer merely to
estates void by reason of an illegal suspension of the power of alienation
(§ 128 id.), but to estates which may be lawfully created, but which the
appointee of the power is incompetent to take by deed directly from the
person creating or reserving the power.
Daniel E. Tylee, the husband, could not have taken a remainder in fee
under the trust deed . . .for the reason that the wife cannot convey

directly to him. Being incapable in law of taking any estate under the
deed creating the power, no estate can be vested in him by any execution
of the power. 145

143 N.Y. Real Prop. Law § 179 (as it read prior to the 1960 amendment).
144 3 Duer 73 (N.Y. Super. Ct. 1854).
145

Id. at 98.
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Actually this was dictum. A separate conveyance by the wife and
husband to a third person, and a reconveyance by that person to the
husband, followed by a mortgage by the husband, were upheld on other
grounds. Concurring in this result, Justice Duer dissented from the
majority's reasoning on the validity of the appointment:
As I construe that section [Rev. Stat., section 129], it only means that
no person shall take an estate under a power that, if limited to him by the
instrument creating the power, would have involved an undue suspension
of the power of alientation; in other words, where its direct limitation
would have been void, as too remote. Section 129 merely declares the legal
consequences of the rule which § 128 [now Real Property Law, section
178] establishes, and is to be construed, precisely as if the word "hence"
had connected the sections, by following the first, and preceding the
second; and both the sections are expressed very nearly in the words in
which the rule and its consequence will be found to be stated by the most
approved text-writers on this abstruse branch of the law, Fearne, Sugden,
and Cruise. As I construe the section, therefore, it refers only to the nature
of the estate granted, and not at all to any personal incapacity of the
grantee, other than that which the rule, declared in § 128, necessarily
creates, although it cannot be denied that the words of the section are
quite susceptible of the interpretation that my brother Bosworth has
given to them. 146
In Matter of Berwind,41 a New York testator created a trust for the
lives of his sister and his nephew. He authorized his niece to appoint by
will 1/30th of the net income and also to appoint the disposition of the
principal of that fractional share. The niece, who died domiciled in
Pennsylvania, provided by her will that the principal of such 1/30th
share should be held on further trusts for life, to begin after the trust
term created by the donor, and directed that the income of such 1/30th
share be retained as principal under her will, to be invested and reinvested as capital, the income on such accumulated income to be paid
to various beneficiaries. Surrogate Foley held that the attempted
exercise of the power was invalid in toto, the disposition of principal
as violating the New York statutes on suspension of the power of alienation, and the disposition of income as violating the New York statutes
on accumulations. It seems that both features of the niece's will were
valid under the law of Pennsylvania with respect to her own property.
But they were held invalid as to the appointive property" since as to
that property New York law was controlling.
Although not conclusive on the point, these two cases are persuasive
authority for the proposition that, in determining the validity of an
accumulation directed by the exercise of a power of appointment, the
146 Id. at 101-02.
147

181 Misc. 559, 42 N.Y.S.2d 58 (Surr. Ct. N.Y. County 1943).
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law in effect at the time of creation of the power, rather than at the
time of its exercise, would govern. A recent law review article, published after completion of the study made by the author, and citing
different cases, reached the same result. 4 8 This seemed inconsistent
with the spirit and intention of the 1958 and 1959 amendments, and
therefore a further amendment appeared to be in order.
The commission accordingly recommended another addition to the
Real Property Law, section 179-c, which was enacted as chapter 458 of
the Laws of 1960, effective April 12, 1960. It reads as follows:
§ 179-c. Accumulation directed by an instrument in execution of a
power. The validity of a direction for the accumulation of the rents and
profits of real property, or the income of personal property, contained in an
instrument in execution of a power heretofore or hereafter created, shall
be determined under the law in effect at the time of the execution of the
power and not the law in effect at the time of the creation of the power.
In its recommendation to the legislature, the commission made it
clear that this amendment, like the other two relating to powers of
appointment, was intended to remove uncertainty and to clarify, rather
than necessarily to change, existing law.' 49 Accordingly, although expressly applicable only to instruments executed on or after April 12,
1960, exercising powers of appointment created prior to that date, the
courts will be free to apply the same rule to instruments executed between September 1, 1959, and April 12, 1960, if they conclude that
this was the true meaning and intention of the 1959 legislation liberalizing the restrictions on accumulations, or that the rule of relation back
does not apply to'the validity of an accumulation in any event. 50
VI. FURTHER CHANGES-LEGAL LIFE ESTATES AND REMAINDERS IN
OR FOLLOWING TERMS OF YEARS

In 1936 and 1938 the Law Revision Commission recommended repeal
of Real Property Law, sections 43 through 47.151
In 1959 the legislature amended Real Property Law, sections 43, 45
and 46, to delete the reference in each of these sections to "two lives"
and substitute a reference to multiple lives, and to make some other
148 Newman, "Exercise of Powers of Appointment as Affected by Recent Legislative
Amendments in New York," 5 N.Y.L.F. 368 (1959).
'49 N.Y. Leg. Doc. No. 65(I) (1960), reprinted in 1960 McKinney's Sess. Law News of
N.Y., No. 4, p. A-129 (Mar. 25, 1960).
150 For a critical view of the whole idea of the amendment, as well as of the 1959
amendments on powers of appointment, raising a doubt as to their constitutionality, see
N.Y. County Lawyers' Ass'n, Comm. on Surrogates' Court, Report No. 290 (March 24,
1960).
151 N.Y. Leg. Doc. (1936) No. 65(H), at 12, reprinted in Report, Recommendations and
Studies of N.Y. Law Rev. Comm'n (1936) at (484); N.Y. Leg. Doc. No. 65(M), 5 (1936),
reprinted in Report, Recommendations and Studies of N.Y. Law Rev. Comm'n (285)

(1938).
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relatively minor changes.' 5 2 No change was made in Real Property
Law, section 44 or section 47.
The precise reason for these amendments is not apparent. It would
seem that they were based on the notion that consistency with the 1958
amendments to Real Property Law, section 42, and Personal Property
153
Law, section 11, required substitution of multiple lives for two lives.
There is however no real connection between the rule against suspension of the power of alienation contained in Real Property Law, section
42, or against suspension of absolute ownership contained in Personal
Property Law, section 11, and the rules set forth in Real Property Law,
sections 43, 44, 45, and 47.154 The original restriction to two lives in

both sets of rules seems more or less fortuitous, although the revisers
undoubtedly believed it a convenient measure to use throughout, and
there was a definite connection between Real Property Law, section 42,
and Real Property Law, section 46.
Nor is it altogether clear why the Revisers proposed these sections
in the first place. Real Property Law, section 46, restricting contingent
remainders on terms of years to those which must vest not later than
the termination of two lives in being, was a specific application of the
New York rule against perpetuities, perhaps considered necessary to
obviate the argument that a remainder, even though contingent, limited
to take effect at the end of a definite period of time, would not come
within the literal prohibition of Real Property Law, section 42. Real
Property Law, section 43, restricting successive life estates to two, given
to persons in being at the creation thereof, and Real Property Law,
section 47, restricting, a life estate limited as a remainder on a term
of years to one given to a person in being at the creation thereof, may
have been attempts to restate in more drastic terms the so-called "Old
Rule Against Perpetuities," which is supposed to have prevented the
limitation of more than one life estate to a person not in being, or
stated more accurately, if an estate is limited to an unborn person for
life with remainder to his issue, the last remainder is void. The very
155
existence of such a rule has been a matter of learned controversy,
N.Y. Sess. Laws 1959, ch. 452.
See Memorandum of Governor Rockefeller, filed with S. Intr. No. 622, Print No.
4244 (April 6, 1959); N.Y. County Lawyers' Ass'n, Comm. on Real Property Law, Report
No. 45 on S. Intr. No. 622, Print No. 622 (Feb. 11, 1959); Ass'n of the Bar of the City of
N.Y., Comm. on State Legislation, Bull. No. 3, p. 199 (Feb. 16, 1959).
154 See In re Chapman's Will, 94 N.Y.S.2d 325 (Surr. Ct. Broome County 1950); 6
American Law of Property § 25.92 (Casner ed. 1952); Klorfein, Estates in Expectancy
§ 61, at 49 (1958) ; 3 Simes & Smith, Law of Future Interests § 1416 (2d ed. 1956) ; Walsh,
Future Estates in New York 197-200 (1931).
155 See, e.g., Gray, Rule Against Perpetuities, App. K, 800-08 (4th ed. 1942); Sweet,
"Contingent Remainders and Other Possibilities," 27 Yale LJ. 977 (1918).
152
153
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but it had been stated by many text-writers as a rule of common law
designed to outlaw the ancient "perpetuity" (a series of unbarrable
remainders in successive generations), and these writings may have influenced the revisers. The existence of the rule was affirmed in Whitby
v. Mitchell,5" but it has since been abolished in England.151 The rule of
Whitby v. Mitchell is said not to be the law anywhere in the United
States.158 The rule was discussed by the Court of Appeals in Jackson
ex dem. Nicoll v. Brown,15 9 but that case was actually decided under
Real Property Law, section 43.
In any event, these statutes have not been of great importance in
New York. McKinney's annotated edition of the Consolidated Laws
cites, under section 43 of the Real Property Law, seven decisions of the
Court of Appeals, eight decisions of the Appellate Division, and seventeen lower court cases. In many of these it was held that the section
had no application. Only two cases are cited for the past ten years.
Under Real Property Law, section 44, three cases are cited; under
section 45, two; under section 46, one; and under section 47, three.
These statistics are not conclusive; some of the cases cited under
particular -sections are irrelevant; some cases which have arisen under
Real Property Law, section 43, are omitted altogether. They do, however, give some idea of the relative infrequency with which these statutes have been litigated. One reason is that Real Property Law, section
43 (and by implication sections 44, 45, and 47), have been construed
as applying only to legal interests, and not to equitable interests under
a trust. 160 (They did, however, apply to personalty as well as realty.'6 1 )
The reason of course is that the legal life estate is not often used today,
having been almost entirely supplanted by the trust. (There has, however, been an interesting revival in estate planning, apparently for tax
reasons, of the legal life estate with power to consume.' 62 This development may result in a wider use of legal life estates in New York, but it
156

42 Ch. Div. 494 (1889), Appeal dismissed 44 Ch. Div. 85 (1890).

157 Law of Property Act of 1925, 15 & 16 Geo. 5, c. 20, § 161(1) 20 Halsbury, Stats,

Eng. 768 (2d ed. 1950).
158 3 Simes & Smith, Law of Future Interests § 1219 (2d ed. 1956); Restatement,
Property § 370, comment q (1944).
159 13 Wend. 437 (N.Y. 1835).
160 In re Chapman's Will, 94 N.Y.S.2d 325 (Surr. Ct. Broome County 1950); Matter of
Terwilligar, 135 Misc. 170, 237 N.Y. Supp. 390 (Surr. Ct. Kings County 1929), aff'd Mem.,
230 App. Div. 763, 243 N.Y. Supp. 898, appeal denied Mem., 230 App. Div. 846, 244 N.Y.

Supp. 808 (2d Dep't 1930).

161 Matter of Bogardus, 43 Misc. 473, 89 N.Y. Supp. 478 (Surr. Ct. N.Y. County 1904);
Purdy v. Hayt, 92 N.Y. 446 (1883).
162 See Note, "Federal Estate Tax Consequences of a Life Estate with the Power to
Consume," 46 Ky. L.J. 586 (1958); Note, "Estate Planning-Life Estate with Power of
Disposal," 32 Notre Dame Law. 141 (1956); Note, 29 Rocky Mt. L. Rev. 132 (1956).
Cf. Pipe's Estate v. Commissioner, 241 F.2d 210 (2d Cir. 1957), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 814
(1957); Brunton v. Easthampton Say. Bank, 336 Mass. 345, 145 N.E.2d 696 (1957).
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is doubtful whether it would have presented any special problems under
Real Property Law, sections 43-47. The general subject of life estates
with power to consume is covered by Real Property Law, sections 149153.163)

It remains to consider the status of these statutes under the 1959
amendments.
1. Real Property Law, section 43
As amended in 1959, this statute required only that successive life
estates be limited to persons in being at the creation thereof. Nothing
was provided as to the effect of a violation, but presumably any life
estate limited to a person not in being would be void, and any remainder
following such invalid life estate would be accelerated if vested, void
if contingent. This would have been the result under the statute before
amendment, and would be the normal result of applying the Rule
Against Perpetuities to such a remainder. 64
Under the amendment, it would have been possible to create more
than two legal life estates to persons in being. This changed the rule
of such cases as Woodruff v. Cook,'65 and Purdy v. Hayt.'66 It would
still have been illegal to limit a life estate to a person not in being, as
was held in Matter of Manley." 7 The Manley case seems to be one of
the very few reported cases involving an attempt to create a secondary
life estate in a person not in being. Even there it was only a possibility
(if there should be an afterborn child of the primary life tenant) which
the court held should be excised. It seems fair to conclude that the
effect of the statute as amended would have been minimal.
It is interesting to observe that, under the 1959 amendments, the rule
as to secondary life estates to unborn persons was the same as to legal
estates and equitable interests under a trust. Both were void, the
former as a direct violation of Real Property Law, section 43, the latter
as an unlawful suspension of the power of alienation beyond lives in
being. Although the same policy considerations did not apply (a legal
life estate is alienable, an equitable life interest under a trust is not),
there was perhaps something to be said for this parallelism.
A number of other jurisdictions formerly had statutes comparable
to Real Property Law, section 43, with either a reference to two lives
163 See Whiteside & Edelstein, "Life Estates with Power to Consume: Rights of Creditors, Purchasers and Remaindermen," 16 Cornell L.Q. 447 (1931).
164 Purdy v. Hayt, 92 N.Y. 446 (1883); Vandenburgh v. Vandenburgh, 85 Misc. 131,
147 N.Y. Supp. 244 (Sup. Ct. Warren County 1914).
165 61 N.Y. 638 (1875).
166 92 N.Y. 446 (1883).
167 1 Misc. 2d 61, 145 N.Y.S.2d 687 (Surr. Ct. Kings County 1955).
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or multiple lives, but such statutes have been repealed in California,
Indiana, Michigan, Minnesota, Montana, and Wisconsin.1 68 They survive in the following jurisdictions:
Arizona (to the same effect as New York Real Property Law, section
17 0
1
North Dakota; 1 7 1
43, prior to the 1959 amendment); 69 Idaho;
Oklahoma;1 72 South Dakota;1 73 (the four last named being similar to
New York Real Property Law, section 43, as amended in 1959, with
provisions for voiding any life estates limited to persons not in being,
and acceleration of vested remainders).
California's former statute was identical to that of Idaho, North
Dakota, Oklahoma, and South Dakota. In 1956, the California Law
Revision Commission recommended repeal of this statute and two related statutes (Civil Code sections 774, 775, 777) .1 7 The reason given
was that the common-law Rule Against Perpetuities is a sufficient restriction on the vesting of contingent remainders, whether in fee or for
life. The California legislature repealed. all three sections in 1959.1-7
2.

Real Property Law, section 44

This statute placed two limitations on remainders following estates
pur autre vie: (i) the remainder had to be in fee, or (ii) if the estate
was in a term of years, the remainder had to be for the whole residue
of the term. The commission recommended repeal of this statute in
1936 and 1938.176 The 1959 amendments did not affect it.
Estates pur autre vie are not common, and there has been very little
litigation under this statute. It is cited in In re Atkinson's Will,'77 but
the only case which seems to have been decided squarely under the
statute is Matter of Bogardus.'
That case involved (i) a primary legal
life estate pur autre vie, (ii) two secondary trusts for the benefit of the
daughters of the primary life tenant for their lives, and (iii) remainders
to the residuary legatees. The trusts were held void as remainders in
168 See 6 American Law of Property § 25.97 (Casner ed. 1952) for references to repealer
statutes in Indiana, Michigan, Minnesota, and Wisconsin; Cal. Stats. 1959 ch. 470, § 7,
repealing Cal. Civ. Code § 774; Mont. L. 1959 ch. 213, § 3, repealing Mont. Rev. Codes
Ann. §§ 67-515 to 67-518.
169 Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 33-232 (1956).
170 Idaho Code Ann. § 55-203 (1957).
171 N.D. Rev. Code § 47-0415 (1943).
172 Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 60, § 36 (1949).
173 S.D. Code § 51.0415 (1939).

174 Recommendations and Study re Suspension of the Absolute Power of Alienation,
1 Cal. L. Rev. Comm'n Rep. G-29 to G-32 (1956); Turrentine, "The Suspension Rule and
Other Statutory Restrictions on Trusts and Future Interests in California," 9 Hastings L.J.
262, 287 (1958).

175 Cal. Stats.. 1959 ch. 470, § 7.
176 Note 151 supra.
177 91 N.Y.S.2d 631 (Surr. Ct. Queens County 1949).
178 43 Misc. 473, 89 N.Y.S.2d 478 (Surr. Ct. N.Y. County 1904).
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less than a fee following an estate pur autre vie. There seemed to be
no justification for this harsh result other than the express command
of the statute.
The other jurisdictions which copied the New York statutory scheme,
and which have not since repealed it, have a similar statute, but it
purports to apply to all remainders following successive life estates,
and not just to remainders following estates pur autre vie.179 The California Law Revision Commission recommended repeal of the corresponding statute in California, and this has been done."'0
3. Real Property Law, section 45
Real Property Law, section 45, related back to section 44. Prior to
1959, it provided that where a remainder was created on an estate pur
autre vie, and more than two persons were named as the persons during
whose lives the life estate shall continue, the remainder should take
effect on the death of the two persons first named. Apparently, there
are no reported cases in which this statute has been litigated. Of the two
cases cited in McKinney's annotation, one did not involve the section
at all, and the other merely mentioned it in passing.
In 1936 and 1938 the commission recommended repeal of section
45.181 In 1959 the legislature amended it to delete the reference to two
lives, so as to permit an estate pur autre vie measured by any reasonable number of lives, with the proviso that if an unreasonable number
of lives are used, the remainder shall take effect immediately on its
182
creation as if no life estates had been created.
It is possible that the Legislature intended the amended section 45
to impose a limit on the number of life estates which may be created
under section 43, as well as under section 44. This is the effect of the
corresponding legislation in Idaho, North Dakota, Oklahoma, and South
Dakota. But it is hard to place this construction on the statute as
it read.
4. Real Property Law, section 46
This statute formerly provided that a contingent remainder could
not be created on a term of years unless it was certain that the remainder must vest within two lives in being. As amended in 1959, the
statute invalidated a contingent remainder on a term of years which
was not certain to vest within a reasonable number of lives.
179 Idaho Code Ann. § 55-204 (1957); N.D. Rev. Code § 47-0416 (1943); Okla. Stat.
Ann. tit 60, § 37 (1949) ; S.D. Code § 51.0416 (1939).
180 Note 175 supra.
181 Note 151 supra.
182 N.Y. Sess. Laws 1959, ch. 452.
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Only one case has been found construing this statute as it stood before
amendment.'8 8 A contingent remainder following a trust measured by
the minority of four children was held invalid. The result could have
been and was in fact also justified under Real Property Law, section 42.
It may be questioned whether section 46 had any application, since
a trust measured by the minority of four children, some or all of whom
might never attain their majority, is hardly a "term of years." (The
court also cited Real Property Law, section 43, clearly inapplicable).
In 1936 and 1938 the commission recommended repeal of Real
Property Law, section 46.184 This was accompanied by other recommended provisions which would clearly have stated the Rule Against
Perpetuities in terms of remoteness of vesting and would have made
Real Property Law, section 46, superfluous.
5.

Real Property Law, section 47

This statute formerly provided that an estate for life could not be
limited as a remainder on a term of years except to a.person in being
at the creation of the estate. In 1936 and 1938 the commission recommended repeal of this section.8 5 The 1959 amendments made no change
in it.
Of the three cases cited in McKinney's annotation to this section,
one held it inapplicable, 86 one actually involved section 57 (at one time
numbered section 47),s1 and the third was decided under Real Property
Law, section 42, and Personal Property Law, section 11, without mention of Real Property Law, section 47.18
California repealed its corresponding statute in 1959, on the recommendation of the California Law Revision Commission. 18 9 But it is
interesting that Michigan, although it has repealed its other statutes
on legal life estates, borrowed from New York, has retained this one. 19 0
Recommendations of Law Revision Commission
The commission recommended that all five sections be repealed.' 9'
The commission pointed out that sections 43, 44, 45, and 47 had no
183 Whitefield v. Whitefield, 123 App. Div. 233, 108 N.Y. Supp. 110 (1st Dep't 1908).
184 Note 151 supra.
185 Ibid.

186 Gilman v. Reddington, 24 N.Y. 9 (1861).
187 Tuthill v. Davis, 121 App. Div. 290, 105 N.Y. Supp. 672 (2d Dep't 1907).
188 Matter of Trowbridge, 124 Misc. 317, 208 N.Y. Supp. 662 (Surr. Ct. N.Y. County
1924).

189 Supra, note 175.
190 Mich. Stat. Ann. § 26.21 (1957). See comment by Munson, "Recent Changes in
Statutory Rules Against Perpetuities," 38 Cornell L.Q. 543, 558 (1953).
191 N.Y. Leg. Doc. No. 65(G) (1960), reprinted in 1960 McKinney's Sess. Law News
of N.Y., No. 4, p. A-115 (Mar. 25, 1960).
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real connection with the rule against suspension of the power of alienation and were not of great importance, being limited to legal life estates
and not being applicable to trusts. It further recommended that section 46 be repealed and the substance thereof transferred to section 50
of the Real Property Law, which already limited the creation of certain future contingent estates (i.e., shifting executory limitations) to
those which must occur, if at all, within the permissible perpetuities
period. These recommendations were adopted and are reflected in
chapter 449 of the Laws of 1960, effective April 12, 1960.
It should be noted that, with these statutes out of the way, it will be
legal in New York to create a secondary legal life estate in an unborn
person because (assuming no other contingency) it would be certain
to vest, if at all, not later than the death of the primary life tenant.
Any further life estates in unborn persons would nearly always violate
both the New York and the common-law Rules Against Perpetuities. 19 2
On the other hand, a secondary income trust in favor of an unborn
person will continue to violate the New York statutes, although not the
common law.
CONCLUSION

The 1960 amendments do not effect any radical changes in the New
York rules relating to perpetuities, powers of appointment, and accumulations, as they stood prior to April 12, 1960. In particular, they do
not change the statutory scheme under which nearly all income trusts
are automatically spendthrift trusts and are subject to the statutory
restrictions on suspension of the power of alienation or of absolute
ownership. 193 But these restrictions have themselves been liberalized.
The permissible period is now identical with that of the common law,
namely, lives in being, one or more periods of gestation, and 21 years.
In other respects as well, the law has been clarified and brought much
closer to the law prevailing in the other forty-nine states and the rest
of the Anglo-American legal world. While some may fear that the
liberalized rules are too great a concession to accumulated wealth, the
control of the dead hand, and the alleged interests of the large metropolitan trust companies,' 94 most practitioners and teachers who work
in the field will welcome the changes as the culmination of a reform
which began in 1936 and 1938 with the pioneer studies of the Law Revi192 Whitby v. Mitchell, 42 Ch. Div. 494 (1889) appeal dismissed, 44 Ch. Div. 85 (1890),
was an example of a limitation which violated the "old" rule against perpetuities but did
not violate the "modem" rule. Such cases are very rare.
193 See Sparks, "Policy Considerations: Alienability of the Beneficial Interest in a Trust
in New York," 9 Buffalo L. Rev. 26 (1959).
-94 See Klorfein, "Public Policy and the Rule Against Perpetuities," 5 N.Y.L.F. 169
(1959).
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sion Commission, bore fruition in the 1958 and 1959 amendments, and
is now rounded out. No longer will the strictures of Chancellor Kent
and of Professors Gray, Walsh, Whiteside, and Powell' 95 be valid. No
longer will the New York law in this area be a reproach among the
nations. As Lord Chancellor Nottingham said in the famous Duke of
Norfolk's case: "Pray let us so resolve Cases here, that they may stand
96
with the Reason of Mankind, when they are debated abroad."'
195 Supra note 4.
196 3 Ch. Cas. 1, 33, 22 Eng. Rep. 931, 951 (Ch. 1682).

